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INTRODUCTION'
Software is a relatively new type of business asset, but already has
taken on a central role in all sectors of the economy; when any asset
brings such a crucial value to businesses,2 the desire for lending based
on that asset cannot be far behind. Unfortunately, the existing aca-
demic literature contains no sustained examination of software-re-
lated lending.
Because the software industry is in its infancy, the existing empiri-
cal evidence is inadequate to support any understanding of it. Ac-
cordingly, I undertook a series of twenty-nine informal interviews with
industry participants, including lenders in both the Massachusetts
Route 128 corridor and Silicon Valley, software companies that bor-
row money to develop software, and large software companies that
must accommodate their customers' need for funds to facilitate the
acquisition of software.3
1 Because all of the applicable bodies of law are rapidly changing, it is useful to
specify in advance the versions of the Uniform Commercial Code to which I refer in the
Article. Except as otherwise indicated, all references to the Uniform Commercial Code in
this Article refer to the official version as of August 1, 1998 (including revised Article 9).
References to "old" Article 9 are to the official version as ofJanuary 1, 1998. For a statutory
compilation containing the UCC (including both versions of Article 9) see COMMERCIAL
AND DEBTOR CREDITOR LAW: SELECTED STATUTES (Douglas G. Baird et al. eds., 1999).
Except as otherwise indicated, references to proposed Article 2B are to the August 1, 1998
discussion draft.
2 Although it is difficult to get accurate statistics, the Bureau of the Census reports
revenue growth in the software industry from $4.3 billion in 1977 to $50.6 billion in 1992.
See Competition in the Computer Industry. Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Econ. and Commercial
Law of the House Comm. on theJudiciay, 103d Cong. 122 tbl.2 (1993).
3 The interviews were conducted in person or by telephone, without providing the
interview subjects prior access to the questions I planned to ask. In most cases, the inter-
views were recorded on a hand-held tape recorder and subsequently transcribed. Tran-
scripts are available by request. In a few cases, the interview subject did not wish the
interview to be recorded (in which case only redacted notes are available). Also, some of
the interview subjects requested anonymity; in those cases the transcripts are redacted to
preserve the anonymity of the interview subject. For a more general discussion of my inter-
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This Article presents the results of those interviews. Although the
relevant legal rules are relatively inhospitable to such lending, the in-
terviews reveal a thriving industry that provides substantial debt invest-
ment in the two primary areas in which software is particularly
valuable to a business: start-up businesses developing software and es-
tablished businesses acquiring software.
The Article proceeds in three steps. Part I sets the stage by ex-
plaining the practical circumstances and background legal rules that
make it improbable that lenders rely on liquidation of collateral as an
exit strategy for an unsuccessful software lending transaction. As the
discussion shows, those problems are more complex and intractable
than they might appear at first glance.
Because those problems provide an almost absolute bar on a
lender's ability to liquidate collateral, they provide a perfect environ-
ment in which to test theories about the basic motivations for busi-
nesses to engage in asset-based lending. In particular, the existence of
a substantial amount of asset-based lending on software flies in the
face of the conventional notion that lenders want to use secured lend-
ing because of the right of liquidation that they get in a secured trans-
action.4 Conversely, the existence of that lending provides strong
support for the developing scholarship that less direct effects on the
borrower's activity and incentives before the point of default actually
motivate parties to use secured lending.5
Parts II and HI are the heart of the article, because they describe
the two principal types of software lending. In both of the areas men-
tioned above-software-development lending and software-acquisition
view methodology, see RonaldJ. Mann, Explaining the Pattern of Secured Credi4 110 HARv. L.
REV. 625, 630-33 (1997).
4 For a general discussion of the conventional justification for secured credit, see id.
at 638-39.
5 See, e.g., David Gray Carlson, On the Efficiency of Secured Lending 80 VA. L. REv. 2179,
2188-89 (1994) (pointing to the creditor's "power to punish the debtor" as a significant
benefit of secured credit); David Gray Carlson, Secured Lending as a Zero-Sum Game, 19 CAR-
DOZO L. Rxv. 1635, 1679-80 (1998) ("[Pjower [as opposed to monitoring] is the main
thing.... Any theory of secured lending must concentrate primarily on power."); Ronald
J. Mann, The Role of Secured Credit in Small-Business Lending, 86 GEO. L.J. 1, 11-26 (1997)
[hereinafter Mann, Small-Business Secured Credit] (arguing that the ability to stave off future
debt motivates the use of secured debt in small-business lending); RonaldJ. Mann, Verifica-
tion Institutions in Financing Transactions, 87 GEO. LJ. 2225, 2244-47 (1999) [hereinafter
Mann, Verification Institutions] (arguing that the same analysis applies more broadly to com-
mercial lending); Alan Schwartz, Priority Contracts and Priority in Bankruptcy, 82 CoRNELL L.
REV. 1396, 1412-14 (1997) (arguing that firms issue secured debt to prevent dilution of
claims by debt issued to later lenders); Robert E. Scott, A Relational Theory of Secured Financ-
ing, 86 COLuM. L. REv. 901, 927-29 (1986) (suggesting that collateral can function as a
"hostage" for the lender); George G. Triantis, Secured Debt Under Conditions of Imperfect Infor-
mation, 21J. LEGAL STuD. 225, 245-47 (1992) (emphasizing the importance of leverage as a
determinant of the use of secured credit); see also Mann, supra note 3, at 638-58 (summariz-
ing alternative justifications for secured credit).
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lending-the parties have overcome the lack of any practical right of
liquidation by developing substitute strategies that provide adequate
remedies to render the transactions practicable.
Part II discusses the first of those transactions, software-develop-
ment lending. Because the commercial development of new software
products ordinarily is a risky endeavor, the typical software developer
must rely on angel investors or venture capitalists to invest a substan-
tial amount of equity in the business. But lenders also have found a
profitable role for debt in that arrangement. The lender relies pri-
marily on a symbiotic relation with the venture capitalist, in which the
lender provides cheaper funds and banking services in return for an
informal commitment by the venture capitalist to repay the debt. As a
practical matter, the lender uses the venture capitalist as equity inves-
tor as an agent to extract the value that the software provides to the
startup company. Traditional remedies available to lenders cannot
extract that value.
Relying on the legally unenforceable commitment of the venture
capitalist, together with the validation of the project coming from the
venture capitalist's own investment in the borrower, the lender can
obtain an adequate assurance of repayment not only in later-stage
startups with revenues from initial product and service sales, but even
in earlier transactions in which the borrower is not yet generating rev-
enues. Part II provides the first academic analysis of the role of debt
in venture-capital companies and thus substantially extends the extant
literature on the venture-capital investment process.
Part m examines the second transaction, software-acquisition
lending. In that area, the customary difficulties of liquidation are
greater, because the end-user of the software typically has only a
nonexclusive license to use the software, and because the licensor typi-
cally will not permit the lender to use or remarket the software. Thus,
liquidation is not just impractical, but entirely prohibited. Neverthe-
less, a thriving lending industry is developing, funding those transac-
tions in much the same way that finance companies fund the
acquisition of tangible equipment for business use. The absence of
liquidation as a remedy seems to pose little or no difficulty for lenders
in that market, because they have another remedy that in practice is
just as effective: an ability to terminate the borrower's use of the
software. The adequacy of that remedy as a device for convincing
lenders to advance funds to software users provides a signal example
of the limited relevance of liquidation to the structure of asset-based
lending transactions.
The right to terminate use poses a challenge to the legal system,
because it is independent of the secured creditor's classic remedies of
repossession and foreclosure. Most importantly, treatment of the as-
19991 137
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set-based software lender as an unsecured lender has a substantial ad-
verse effect on that lender if its borrower files for bankruptcy. The
Bankruptcy Code's traditional differential treatment of secured and
unsecured lenders-that is, its unfavorable treatment of lenders classi-
fied as unsecured-reflects a fundamental weakness in the standard
classification of lenders.6 The closing pages of this Article examine
the normative basis for that preference and conclude that it would
make more sense for the bankruptcy system to respect the functional
effectiveness of the software lender's right to terminate use. Ideally,
that lender's priority would depend on compliance with a public filing
requirement. But I would extend priority even without such a filing
system in place.
The difficulties that the law has faced in dealing with those issues
are symptomatic of a more general problem, a shift in emphasis in the
process of codifying commercial law. During the glory days of the
drafting of the original Uniform Commercial Code, scholars devoted
tremendous effort to identifying and understanding the relevant busi-
ness practices, so that the law would reflect, guide, and support those
practices. 7 Unfortunately, as practices have changed, the law has not
kept pace. This Article poignantly illustrates the law's inability to pro-
vide adequate governance of business practices in new industries with-
out a codification process that focuses directly on those practices.
I
LIQUIDATING SECURIY INTERESTS IN SoFTWARE
My prior work on secured credit has emphasized the difficulties
that lenders face in liquidating collateral in particular contexts. For
example, I have argued that small-business secured lenders place little
reliance on their ability to liquidate assets held by small-business bor-
rowers, because those assets are likely to have limited value if the bor-
rower fails.8 Any discussion of software financing must start with the
point that liquidation difficulties are more severe for software lenders
than for other lenders. My point is not simply that software is difficult
to liquidate in the same way that accounts receivable of a failed small
business might be difficult to liquidate. I argue instead that funda-
mental practical differences and firmly held legal distinctions make
software categorically more difficult to liquidate than traditional
forms of real and personal property.
6 See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1994) (dividing an undersecured creditor's claim into
a "secured claim" and an "unsecured claim").
7 See, e.g., Grant Gilmore, On the Difficulties of Codifying Commercial Law, 57 YALE LJ.
1341, 1341 (1948) ("The principal objects of draftsmen of general commercial legislation
... which is designed to clarify the law about business transactions rather than to change
the habits of the business community ... . are to be accurate and not to be original.").
8 See Mann, Small-Business Secured Credi4 supra note 5, at 15-17.
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A. Practical Obstacles to the Liquidation of Software-Related
Collateral
1. The Short HalfiLfe of Software Liquidation Value
Although software can be quite valuable to the business that owns
it, a lender that tries to sell the software to recover the balance of its
loan must overcome numerous practical obstacles, starting with the
rapid pace at which software becomes obsolete. At least under cur-
rent circumstances, software technology develops much more rapidly
than the technology of most other business assets. Thus, software that
implements cutting-edge technology can become fatally inferior to
newly developed products in just a short time. The lender might not
know why or exactly when, but it must accept a significant probability
that the market value of the software to a potential new user will decay
and reach zero within a relatively short time span.9
The rapid development curve for software produces a broad gap
between the value of software to the original end-user and the value of
the same software in liquidation. In the facility of an end-user whose
business practices incorporate it, the software might be enormously
valuable. Yet the same piece of software might be so far behind the
current technology that it would have no value whatsoever in the open
market; no end-user selecting a new system would want to choose the
obsolete product. The year-2000 software problem illustrates the
point well. Every business troubled with a year-2000 problem could
replace all of its old software with new software sufficiently sophisti-
cated to recognize the twilight of the millennium. The fact that busi-
nesses contemplate spending literally billions of dollars to repair
existing software in response to that problem (instead of purchasing
wholly new software) shows the huge gap between the in-place and
market values of software. 10
9 See Telephone Interview with Mark Trachy, State Street Bank (Mar. 10, 1998)
[hereinafter Trachy Interview] (transcript at 4, on file with author) (suggesting that a typi-
cal product life cycle is 15-18 months). One software lender to whom I spoke argued that
the rapid decay of software value is at least partially psychological: people expect software
to become obsolete much more rapidly than it really does. See Telephone Interview with
Mark Bazrod, President, LPI Software Funding Group, Inc. (Nov. 9, 1998) [hereinafter
Bazrod Interview] (transcript at 5-6, on fie with author). It also is important to realize that
the value of software endures much longer if the software is updated regularly. See Tele-
phone Interview with Hal Hayden, General Manager, First Sierra Software Finance (Dec.
14, 1998) [hereinafter Hayden Interview] (transcript at 3, on file with author) (explaining
the distinction between the rapid obsolescence of unmaintained software and the relatively
enduring value of updated software). The lender, however, ordinarily is not in a position
to provide the updating necessary to maintain software value. See infra Part IA2.
10 See Interview with Robert B. McAuley, Program Manager, Microsoft Corporation, in
Redmond, Wash. (Nov. 11, 1998) [hereinafter McAuley Interview] (transcript at 6, on file
with author) (noting the large number of customers still using old and relatively obsolete
Microsoft products); Hayden Interview, supra note 9 (transcript at 3) (explaining that the
kinds of software systems that the interview subject is financing "cannot be replaced over-
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The low marginal cost of reproducing software is the principal
cause of the valuation gap. In the case of traditional production ma-
chinery, even an outdated machine has some market value: a business
using similar machinery that needs to expand its production capabili-
ties might be willing to pay a positive sum to purchase the outdated
machine. Because producing an additional machine requires the con-
sumption of "real" resources, even the used machine is likely to retain
some value as a substitute for the cost of constructing a new one. In
the case of software, however, that should not be true, because the
cost to create an additional unit of software is insignificant. Thus,
even a business dependent on using the same obsolete software that
the lender has for sale is unlikely to be interested in paying the lender
any significant amount of money for the right to purchase an addi-
tional copy of that software.
In sum, the liquidation value of software against which a lender
loans money generally depreciates much more rapidly than the
software's value to its user does. Accordingly, lenders cannot rely on
the liquidation value of the collateral to justify a loan of funds to be
repaid under an amortization schedule based on the useful life of the
collateral in the hands of the user. As you would expect, lenders un-
derstand the situation well. As one lender aptly put it, "people in our
business.., don't like the prospects of having to liquidate these kinds
of assets because ... the values drop off the table very quickly.""
2. The Lender's Inability to Support the Software
A similar difficulty arises from the separation between the owner-
ship of a particular copy of a computer program and the expertise
necessary to support the use of the program. One effect of the rapid
night"); Bazrod Interview, supra note 9 (transcript at 5-6) (discussing the value of older
software in place and explaining that "when you get to large systems that people are mak-
ing major investments in[,] ... you don't change those things overnight").
11 Trachy Interview, supra note 9 (transcript at 8). For similar perspectives on the
short useful life of software products, see, for example, Interview with John D. McIntosh,
President and CEO, Applied Dynamics International, in Ann Arbor, Mich. (Apr. 8, 1998)
(statement of software designer) [hereinafter McIntosh Interview] (transcript at 1, on file
with author) (noting that he puts out new releases of his major software products at the
rate of two a year and noting, "What we are doing today-seven years from now, or even
two or three years from now will be the old technology") and Telephone Interview with
Elizabeth Passela, Team Leader of National Team, Information Technology Division,
BankBoston (Mar. 8, 1998) [hereinafter Passela Interview] (transcript at 10, on file with
author) (describing difficulties that lender faced in liquidating obsolete Wang software);
see also Telephone Interview with Chip Halverson, Comdisco (Apr. 3, 1998) [hereinafter
Halverson Interview] (transcript at 1-2, on fie with author) (agreeing with the proposition
that, compared to equipment leasing, software leasing is impractical because the software
will have no residual value at the end of the lease term); Telephone Interview with Stepha-
nie Guiste, Microsoft Corporation (Mar. 11, 1998) [hereinafter Guiste Interview] (tran-
script at 4, on file with author) (suggesting that the residual value of software is so low that
it makes little sense to characterize transactions as leasing instead of finance).
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pace of software development is that, at least in our current state of
technology, most business software requires more continuing mainte-
nance from the developer-owner than the typical piece of business
machinery does. Software, especially cutting-edge software, often suf-
fers from "bugs" and other minor problems that make it impractical
for the software to be implemented without continuing assistance and
maintenance from the software developer. The assistance can take
the form of episodic technical advice about the existing software or a
series of improvements in the form of upgrades. In either case, the
initial computer program standing alone-without any support or
maintenance-has a significantly diminished value. In order to main-
tain the value of the collateral even in the hands of the original user, it
is important that support and maintenance remain available.12
The importance of support and maintenance services will be a
hindrance to any lender foreclosing on software-related collateral if it
cannot provide that support and maintenance. For example, if a
lender forecloses on a user that has failed to repay a loan for a
software acquisition, it will be difficult for the lender to obtain a good
resale price for the software unless the lender can force the software
developer to provide those services to the party purchasing on resale.
Similarly, if the lender forecloses on a software developer, it may be
hard-pressed to force even the existing users of the developer's
software to continue paying for the software that they already have
purchased.' 3 The moment the software developer goes out of busi-
ness, excuses tend to "come out of the woodwork" in response to any
effort by the lender to force the users to comply with their obligations
to pay for that software.'4
12 See Bazrod Interview, supra note 9 (transcript at 5) (noting that most software licen-
sees tend to sign software maintenance agreements). Indeed, several interview subjects
explained that software can retain its value for a surprisingly long time if it is operated
under a maintenance and support agreement. See Hayden Interview, supra note 9 (tran-
script at 3); Bazrod Interview, supra note 9 (transcript at 5).
13 See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Douglas P. Wetzel, CEO, International Software
Finance Corp. (Jan. 5, 1999) [hereinafter Wetzel Interview] (transcript at 4, on file with
author) (explaining that it is much easier for an equipment lessor to resell used equip-
ment than it is for a software lessor to resell software because "we are not skilled at selling
[the vendor's] software"); Passela Interview, supra note 11 (transcript at 5) (describing that
difficulty and ways to mitigate the problem of continuing service obligations in the context
of software-based receivables).
14 Trachy Interview, supra note 9 (transcript at 3) ("[M]ore often than not in a young
company where the technology is new, if they're bundling a maintenance agreement as
well with a license-software license-the customer is going to challenge the validity of
that underlying receivable-I mean all kinds of excuses come out of the woodwork.").
That problem, of course, is not unique to software, but afflicts many types of intangible
collateral, most obviously accounts receivable.
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B. Legal Obstacles to Obtaining Priority in Software-Related
Collateral
Even if a software lender could develop business practices and
arrangements adequate to overcome the practical difficulties identi-
fied above, the lender still would have to confront a legal system that,
to put it frankly, evinces a deep hostility to lenders attempting to fi-
nance the acquisition or development of intellectual property.
Software lenders that wish to obtain a security interest in the software
on which their loan might be based must confront a set of filing sys-
tems and ownership rules that were not designed to accommodate the
practicalities of those transactions.
1. Where to File?
The most prominent difficulty with the filing system is that the
proper place to file is unclear-so unclear that sophisticated partici-
pants in the industry disagree about the correct location for making a
filing to perfect a security interest in software and related assets. That
lack of clarity is a serious problem in any transaction involving a secur-
ity interest in software, including the development transactions dis-
cussed below.' 5
The confusion is difficult to understand, because the rules for
perfecting security interests in software are relatively straightforward.
Although there certainly is some room for doubt, software generally
receives its protection not from the standard common-law rules of
state property law, but from the federal Copyright Act.'6
15 For a discussion of the development transactions, see infra Part II.
16 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1101 (1994 & Supp. III1997). See generally, e.g., ROBERT P. MERGES
Er AL., INTELLEcTuAL PROPERTY IN THE NEv TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 860-955 (1997) (discuss-
ing the origin and nature of copyright protection for software).
Although it once was considered impossible to obtain patent protection on software,
recent decisions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit have made
patent protection for software at least a theoretical possibility. See, e.g., In re Alappat, 33
F.3d 1526, 1536-45 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc) (finding patentable subject matter in an
algorithm for displaying a smooth wave form in a digital oscilloscope); see also Telephone
Interview with Mark Radcliffe, Partner at Gray, Cary, Ware & Friedenrich (Mar. 11, 1998)
[hereinafter Radcliffe Interview] (transcript at 5, on file with author) ("I would say that the
majority of software companies either have patents or are seeking to file patents.").
For now, however, patent protection for software remains much less common than
copyright protection. See generally MERGES ET AL., supra, at 955-1004 (discussing the require-
ments for patent protection of software). Moreover, because patent protection, unlike
copyright protection, exists only upon filing with the Patent and Trademark Office, the
lender can ignore patent issues unless the borrower already has sought patent protection.
In any event, when patent filing issues are relevant, the same confusion that is present in
the context of copyrights exists, further complicated by a significantly different set of fed-
eral statutes. For a summary of the issues that security interests in patents present, see, for
example, Alice Haemmerli, Insecurity Interests: Where Intellectual Property and Commercial Law
Collide, 96 GOLUM. L. REV. 1645, 1696-1716 (1996).
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The Act includes an asset-based filing and registration system
much like the standard systems for perfecting liens against real estate.
Among other things, section 205 (a) of the Copyright Act provides that
"[a] ny transfer of copyright ownership or other document pertaining
to a copyright may be recorded in the Copyright Office."1 7 Although
the language of that provision leaves some room for doubt, the defini-
tional section of the Act (section 101) defines the term "transfer of
copyright ownership" in a way that makes it clear that a grant of a
security interest in a copyright is covered by section 205(a). Specifi-
cally, a "transfer of copyright ownership" includes any "assignment,
mortgage ... or hypothecation of a copyright or of any of the exclu-
sive rights comprised in a copyright."' 8
Although section 205(a) simply states that a transfer "may be re-
corded in the Copyright Office,"' 9 the statute effectively makes that
filing mandatory, because section 205(d) grants priority to a second-
in-time recorded transfer over a prior but unrecorded transfer if the
first-in-time transferee fails to record within one month after execu-
tion of its transfer.20 Thus, a lender that wants a guaranteed protec-
tion against subsequent lenders must file in the Copyright Office
within one month of the date on which the borrower grants the secur-
ity interest.2 ' To ensure priority over any prior lenders, the new
lender must wait one month after it has filed to exhaust the possibility
of any superior deferred filings by preexisting unrecorded lenders.
For some time, Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code
(UCC) has included provisions recognizing the applicability of the
federal filing system to security interests in copyright-protected prop-
erty. Specifically, old UCC section 9-302(3) (a) 22 stated:
17 17 U.S.C. § 205(a).
18 Id. § 101 (internal quotation marks omitted). Although the definition of "transfer"
does refer specifically to assignments and mortgages, the absence of any serious effort to
include substantive provisions to accommodate actual lending transactions suggests that
Congress did not seriously consider the application of the Copyright Act to lending
transactions.
19 Id. § 205(a) (emphasis added).
20 See id. § 205(d).
21 It is not at all clear that the federal filing is necessary to protect against the creditor-
like rights of a trustee in bankruptcy under section 544 of the Bankruptcy Code. See 11
U.S.C. § 544 (1994). Section 544 grants the trustee the rights that three types of claimants
described in the section acquire as of the date of the bankruptcy. The provisions relevant
here-lI U.S.C. § 544(a) (1)-(2)-refer to creditors that obtain judicial liens or execute
judgments against a borrower. See id. Because the Copyright Act includes no provisions
providing for those kinds of creditor remedies, it is not clear that such a creditor would be
able to obtain priority in the Copyright Office filing system over a secured creditor because
of the secured creditor's failure to protect its interest by filing under the federal Copyright
Act.
22 As I explained earlier, see supra note 1, Article 9 of the UCC recently was revised.
References to "old" Article 9 are to the official version as ofJanuary 1, 1998. Unqualified
references to Article 9 are to the current version adopted in May 1998.
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(3) The filing of a financing statement otherwise required by this
Article is not necessary or effective to perfect a security interest in
property subject to
(a) a statute or treaty of the United States which provides for a
national . . . registration . . . or which specifies a place of filing
different from that specified in this Article for filing of the security
interest .... 23
The Copyright Act seems to satisfy the UCC test for an alternative fil-
ing system, because it provides for a national registration and specifies
a filing in the federal Copyright Office.24 Indeed, the comments to
section 9-302 of the old Article 9 specifically listed the Copyright Act
as one of the federal recording statutes to which that provision re-
fers.2 5 Thus, although the old Article 9 did not acknowledge the revi-
sion of the Copyright Act to include the provisions discussed above,2 6
a fairly straightforward reading of the statute suggests that, at least
under Article 9 as it existed until 1998, a prudent creditor wishing to
perfect a security interest in copyrighted software should file in the
federal copyright records and that a parallel state UCC filing was "not
necessary or effective," to use the language of section 9-302(3) of the
old UCC.27
23 U.C.C. § 9-302(3) (a).
24 For a discussion of the preemptive effect of the Copyright Act on Article 9, see, for
example, Haemmerli, supra note 16, at 1664-68.
25 See Old U.C.C. § 9-302 cmt. 8. Comment 8 refers to sections 28 and 30 of the
Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075 (repealed 1976), because the comment was
written before Congress enacted the current Copyright Act in 1976. Sections 28 and 30 of
the 1909 Act were analogous to section 205 of the 1976 Act (the provision discussed in the
text). The brevity of the comment and its complete lack of reference to the current law
underscore the lack of serious consideration of the preemption question. Thus, given the
difficulties with the federal system outlined in the subsequent sections, it is fair to ask
whether the federal system as it currently exists is adequate for purposes of that comment.
26 See Old U.C.C. § 9-302 cmt. 8.
27 Old U.C.C. § 9-302(3). However, the significance of that ineffectiveness is quite
limited. For one thing, as mentioned above, it remains unclear that the federal-law filing is
necessary to protect against the trustee in bankruptcy. See supra note 21. If it is not, per-
haps a state-law filing is necessary and effective in providing such protection.
From a more pragmatic perspective, many-probably most-lending transactions that
include copyrighted assets also include some property other than the copyright. Ordina-
rily, the state-law financing statement is effective (and necessary) to perfect an interest
against those assets. Most importantly, state-law filings seem to be required with respect to
software-related receivables. Because a transfer of a security interest in a payment received
for the use of software is not a "transfer of copyright ownership" for purposes of the Copy-
right Act, 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994) (internal quotation marks omitted), the priority rules of
17 U.S.C. § 205(d) should not apply to transactions granting security interests in such as-
sets. Cf Broadcast Music Inc. v. Hirsch, 104 F.3d 1163, 1166-67 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding
that an outright assignment of an interest in royalties to creditors need not be recorded in
the federal system, but reserving the question of whether the same rule would apply to a
collateral assignment of an interest in royalties).
Unfortunately, two recent lower-court cases call that analysis into doubt. See National
Peregrine, Inc. v. Capitol Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n (In re Peregrine Entertainment, Ltd.), 116
B.R. 194, 199 (C.D. Cal. 1990) ("[Ain agreement creating a security interest in the receiv-
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Revised Article 9 is somewhat more guarded on the question, not-
ing only that compliance with Article 9 is not necessary for property
subject to "a statute... of the United States whose requirements for a
security interest's obtaining priority over the rights of a lien creditor
with respect to the property preempt [the UCC filing requirement in]
Section 9-310(a)." 28 The change in wording, however, should not be
interpreted to reflect a view that the federal filing system does not
apply. The preemptive effect of federal law comes not from the UCC
drafters, but from the Supremacy Clause. 29 Hence, regardless of what
the UCC says about the matter, a provision in the Copyright Act that
delineated a rule of priority between competing transferees necessar-
ily would give effect to filings in the federal system and prevent any
state law from granting a conflicting priority based on a filing in a
state system.
The more cautious phrasing should be read to reflect a sensible
trend towards a general hands-off approach to preemption issues. It
would be pointless for the UCC drafters to attempt to describe the
precise bounds of federal preemption, because federal courts doubt-
less will feel free to resolve those questions for themselves without re-
gard to the pronouncement of state legislatures adopting the UCC.
Moreover, it would be particularly futile to try to define the scope of
preemption in this context, given the possibility that the difficulties
discussed below might lead Congress to eliminate the federal filing
obligation and leave the field to state-law filings.30
ables generated by a copyright may also be recorded in the Copyright Office."); In re Ava-
lon Software Inc., 209 B.R. 517, 521 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1997) (suggesting that the federal
filing requirement "extends to the proceeds naturally derived from the copyrighted mate-
rial"). Although neither case directly held that a federal filing is necessary to obtain priority
over copyright-related receivables, they have generated a significant amount of commen-
tary suggesting that such a filing is appropriate. See, e.g., Haemmerli, supra note 16, at
1680-81 (reading Peregrine to require federal filing for copyright-related receivables); Noel
D. Humphreys, The Peril of Copyrightable Materials as Security, PA. LAw., Mar.-Apr. 1998, at 42,
42-43 (pointing out some absurd results of the Avalon court's requirement of federal filing
to perfect a security interest in proceeds of copyrighted material); see also Raymond T.
Nimmer, An Update on Financing with Intellectual Property as Collaterak Part II offf, J. PROPRIE-
TARY RTs., Nov. 1997, at 10, 11 (noting that a security interest in a licensor's right to receive
payments under an exclusive copyright license "arguabl[y] ... requires perfection (record-
ing) in the federal registration system"). In my view, the entire problem could be resolved
by a well-reasoned opinion from the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit;
considering the volume of West Coast lending in the area, see infra Part II, such an opinion
seems likely in the next few years.
28 U.C.C. § 9-311 (a) (1).
29 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cI. 2.
30 Congress currently is considering a proposed Federal Intellectual Property Security
Act. The proposed Act would leave matters of perfection and priority in copyright lending
transactions to Article 9. A copy of this proposed Act is available at American Bar Ass'n,
Section of Intellectual Property Law, Federal Intellectual Property Security Act (visited Aug. 9,
1999) <http://www.abanet.org/intelprop/106legis/fipsa.html>.
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Notwithstanding the analysis summarized above, it came as a con-
siderable shock to practitioners3' when judge Kozinski concluded that
the Copyright Act completely preempts Article 9 with respect to copy-
right lending in the district court decision of National Peregrine, Inc. v.
Capitol Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n (In re Peregrine Entertainment,
Ltd.).3 2 That case involved the Chapter 11 bankruptcy of a business
(National Peregrine, Inc.) that owned a library of copyrights, distribu-
tion rights, and licenses to approximately 145 films. 33 The bankrupt
company had been in the business of licensing those films to pro-
grammers and collecting revenues in the form of license fees from the
programmers.3 4 At the time of Peregrine's bankruptcy, Capitol held a
six-million-dollar line of credit secured by the film library.3 5
Capitol had not made a filing in the Copyright Office, but instead
had attempted to perfect its interest by filing a UCC-1 in the state of
Peregrine's incorporation and in various states in which Peregrine did
business. 36 Reasoning that the state UCC filing was insufficient to per-
fect Capitol's security interest,37 Judge Kozinski allowed the debtor to
use the Bankruptcy Code's "strong-arm clause" to invalidate Capitol's
interest in the copyright library.38
The most interesting aspect of the practice in the area is that,
notwithstanding the provisions of the Copyright Act and the widely
noted Peregrine decision, many lenders continue to file only in the
state UCC records.39 Different lenders offer different reasons for that
31 See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Dennis J. White, Sullivan & Worcester, LLP
(Mar. 5, 1998) [hereinafter White Interview] (transcript at 6, on file with author) (describ-
ing Peregrine as "just some wacko case out in California"); Telephone Interview with James
F. Forrester, Head of Corporate Finance, Silicon Valley Bank (Feb. 19, 1998) [hereinafter
Forrester Interview] (transcript at 12, on file with author) (characterizing issues raised in
Peregrine as "goofy" and referring to the Ninth Circuit as "the one that stirred the hornet's
nest up").
32 116 B.R. 194 (C.D. Cal. 1990).
33 See id. at 197.
34 See id.
35 See i&
36 See id. at 197-98.
37 See ia at 198-204.
38 See id. at 204-07 (applying section 544(a) (1) of the Bankruptcy Code). But see supra
note 21 (questioning application of section 544(a) to enforce the federal filing require-
ment). See generally 4 JAMES J. WHrrE & ROBERT S. SuMrMRs, UNIFORM CoMMERCIAL CODE
§ 32-3 (4th ed. 1995) (discussing the trustee's rights under section 544(a) of the Bank-
ruptcy Code).
39 See White Interview, supra note 31 (transcript at 2-3) (describing a large transaction
in which a lender required filings only with respect to the 25 most valuable pieces of
software out of a library of "hundreds if not thousands of titles"); id. (transcript at 8) (sug-
gesting that "most lenders" do not require federal copyright filings on software loans below
$10 million); Passela Interview, supra note 11 (transcript at 4) (statement of bank officer)
(noting that she "would prefer to have [filings] with the copyright office," but that "[i t is
not a hard and fast rule"); Forrester Interview, supra note 31 (transcript at 13) (statement
of bank officer) (noting that his bank files only in the state filing system in jurisdictions
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practice. Some suggest that their attorneys have advised them that
other courts would be unlikely to follow Peregrine.40 Based on the anal-
ysis above, I find that explanation overly optimistic (however benefi-
cial such holdings might be for the system as a whole). Others offer
more practical reasons, such as the cost of filing in the federal system;
unlike the debtor-based Article 9 filing system, the federal copyright
system is asset-based and thus requires a separate filing for each item.
For lenders contemplating loans on large libraries or portfolios of col-
lateral, that requirement can make the filing costs quite high.41
Here, as in other lending markets, lenders faced with high filing
costs can be persuaded to forgo filings if they think that the value of a
perfected security interest cannot justify the cost of the filing.42 My
impression, however, is that cost alone is not the problem. The root
of the problem is evident from the next two subsections: even if the
lender tries to comply with the system and is willing to pay the filing
fees, it will be difficult for the lender to provide filings that satisfy the
Copyright Act's filing procedures.
2. What to File?
The deposit requirement of the Copyright Act typifies the poor
fit between the Act's filing procedures and the practicalities of
software-financing transactions. Under Article 9, of course, the lender
taking an interest in an asset needs to file only a simple one-page fi-
nancing-statement form.43 For the lender to make a filing under the
Copyright Act, however, the borrower first must register the copy-
outside the Ninth Circuit). I have not spoken with a single lender or attorney outside the
Ninth Circuit who asserted that his employer or clients regularly file in the Copyright Of-
fice on loans secured by copyright-protected assets.
40 See Forrester Interview, supra note 31 (transcript at 13) (suggesting that "the bank-
ruptcy attorneys out there [on the East Coast] ... have not been successful in dragging
that Peregrine into [the issue]").
41 See White Interview, supra note 31 (transcript at 2) ("There are also issues for com-
panies where you know they have huge inventories of intellectual property that the cost of
filing is just prohibitive.").
42 See Interview with Anonymous Technology-Bank Credit Officer, in Santa Clara, Cal.
(Nov. 12, 1998) [hereinafter Technology-Bank Credit Officer Interview] (transcript at 2,
on file with author) (acknowledging that his bank often "may not have a perfected filing in
the code"); Interview with Anonymous Technology-Bank Emerging-Business Lender, in
Santa Clara, Cal. (Nov. 12, 1998) [hereinafter Technology-Bank Emerging-Business
Lender Interview] (transcript at 11-12, on file with author) (noting that his bank does not
insist on registration and filing for smaller transactions); White Interview, supra note 31
(transcript at 6-8) (suggesting that competitive cost pressures limit the ability of lenders to
require federal copyright filings on small loans); cf. Mann, Small-Business Secured Credit,
supra note 5, at 28 (presenting anecdotal evidence that even the modest Article 9 filing fees
drive small-business bank lenders to unsecured transactions).
43 See U.C.C. § 9-502(a) (describing formal requirements for UCC financing state-
ment); U.C.C. § 9-521 (a) (providing a standard form and requiring filing offices to accept
an initial financing statement in that form).
1999]
CORNELL LAW REVEW
righted material with the Copyright Office.44 Registration requires
the borrower (as copyright owner) to deposit two copies of the mate-
rial with the Copyright Office.45
The deposit requirement is of little consequence when the copy-
righted material is a book-the owner simply forwards two copies of
the book to the Copyright Office-but several aspects of the require-
ment make it a real problem for software. The biggest difficulty is the
archaic insistence that the deposit be in a form "visually perceptible
without the aid of a machine or device."46 What that requirement
means as a practical matter is that it is not enough for the copyright
owner to give the Copyright Office a copy of the software in the form
that would be sold to a user. Instead, the copyright owner must pro-
vide the Copyright Office with a printed copy of the source code for
the copyright.
Software developers are reluctant to release their source code,
because competitors easily can "reverse engineer" from the code to
develop competing programs that use the same concepts, but do not
infringe the copyright of the protected program. Because borrowers
that do not register their software do not lose any significant copyright
protections, software developers frequently avoid the danger of re-
vealing their source code by not registering their software with the
Copyright Office. From the borrower's perspective, the filing require-
ment forces the borrower to do much of the work of the potential
reverse engineer by providing a clean copy of the precious source
code.47 Accordingly, lenders face an uphill battle in convincing their
borrowers to comply with the deposit requirement.48
The problem has been mitigated by revisions to the regulation
that now permit the copyright owner to deposit only a limited portion
of the source code. Even with those revisions, however, the borrower
nevertheless must file a substantial amount of the code.49 Thus, my
44 See 17 U.S.C. § 205(c) (2) (1994) (stating that Copyright Office filings give con-
structive notice only if "registration has been made for the work").
45 See id. § 407(a)(1).
46 37 C.F.R. § 202.20(c) (2) (vii) (A) (1998).
47 See White Interview, supra note 31 (transcript at 7) (explaining how the potential
for piracy makes many software companies reluctant to copyright their software).
48 See Passela Interview, supra note 11 (transcript at 4) ("[T]here are occasionally
companies that don't want to [file in the Copyright Office]. We would have more discus-
sions with them about it."); Forrester Interview, supra note 31 (transcript at 10) ("[T]he
hardest thing is to get the companies to copyright their software.").
49 The regulation provides a complex formula for determining the required amount
of the deposit for computer programs. That formula generally requires about 50 pages of
the source code; the regulation also permits the copyright owner to block out some por-
tions of those pages if they contain protectible trade secrets, so long as the deposit includes
at least 20 pages of actual code. See 37 C.F.R § 202.20(c) (2) (vii) (A) (1)-A(2). Lenders rely
on those revisions to the regulations in their efforts to convince borrowers to file at the
federal level. See Technology-Bank Credit Officer Interview, supra note 42 (transcript at 2)
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interviews suggest, those revisions have not removed the concerns that
software developers have about making a public filing of portions of
their source code.50 In the end, software-development lenders often
concede the point, leaving their loans at least partially unprotected
through the failure of the borrower to register the copyrighted
collateral.5 1
3. The Problem of Developing Collateral: When to File?
The most debilitating obstacle for software lenders is the limited
scope of perfection under the Copyright Act. The obstacle arises
from a mismatch between the types of works for which federal law
preempts the UCC filing system, on the one hand, and the types of
works for which federal protection is available, on the other. That
mismatch leaves a considerable window in the development process,
during which neither state nor federal protection is practicable.
On the first point, the prior section explains the possibility that
federal law preempts state law with respect to any item that has
reached the stage at which rights attach under the federal Copyright
Act.5 2 Thus, once an item is protected under the Copyright Act, a
transfer of the item not recorded in the Copyright Office arguably, as
a matter of federal law, would not have priority.
The standard for federal protection is so low, however, that copy-
right protection attaches at an early stage in the work's development.
All that is required is an "original wor[k] of authorship fixed in any
tangible medium of expression. ''5 3 As the Second Circuit has ex-
plained, the originality standard is satisfied whenever the purported
author provides "something more than a 'merely trivial' variation,
something recognizably 'his own.' 54 Thus, a software program surely
would receive copyright protection long before the end of its develop-
("[I] t is important that we could go to the client and say you can get by... with giving the
first ten... and the last ten pages of code. You don't have to necessarily give the 40 in
between."); Forrester Interview, supra note 31 (transcript at 10-11).
50 See Technology-Bank Credit Officer Interview, supra note 42 (transcript at 2) (not-
ing that software developers are "psychologically adverse" to making the required filings
even though the rules seem to minimize any risk of piracy).
51 See id. (transcript at 2-3) (expressing a willingness to forgo filings on loans that are
graded as having a low risk); Technology-Bank Emerging-Business Lender Interview, supra
note 42 (transcript at 11-12) (describing a willingness to forgo registration on small lend-
ing transactions); Passela Interview, supra note 11 (transcript at 4) ("It is not a hard and
fast rule but certainly we would prefer to have them filed with the copyright office.");
Forrester Interview, supra note 31 (transcript at 11) (suggesting that his bank requires fl-
ings "unless [it has] lots of cushion in the deal").
52 See supra Part I.B.1.
53 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1994).
54 Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 103 (2d Cir. 1951) (cita-
tion omitted) (upholding copyright protection for high-quality reproductions of public-
domain paintings).
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ment. The developer does something more than "merely trivial" well
before it has a completed program ready for retail delivery.
Unfortunately, courts consistently have held that a lender cannot
obtain a perfected security interest in a work (i.e., a "transfer of own-
ership" under section 205 (a) of the Copyright Act) until the work has
been registered with the federal Copyright Office.55 For the reasons
discussed above, software developers have a powerful incentive to de-
lay federal registration as long as possible. 56 Thus, it is a common, if
not unavoidable, occurrence for copyright protection to attach (thus
excluding the possibility of state-law perfection by the lender) long
before the point of registration, when federal-law perfection becomes
possible.57
That framework is quite troubling from the perspective of a
lender trying to obtain a perfected interest in software. The lender
knows (or at least it hopes) that its borrower will be working every day
to improve the software. But if the borrower does not register the
software until it is complete, then the security interest remains un-
perfected until that time. Imagine what a construction lender would
think of a system in which it could not obtain a perfected interest in a
building until the building had been completed!
Nor is there any simple way for the lender to respond to the prob-
lem. Even if the lender requires intermediate filings-perhaps every
quarter, as many lenders do58 -it is not entirely protected, because its
55 See In re Avalon Software Inc., 209 B.R. 517, 522 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1997) ("[I]n order
to claim a perfected security interest, a creditor must file that interest with the U.S. Copy-
right Office."); Official Unsecured Creditors' Comm. v. Zenith Prods., Ltd. (In re AEG
Acquisition Corp.), 127 B.R. 34, 41 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1991) (Bufford,J.) ("Perfection of a
security interest in a motion picture, as in any copyright, requires two steps: the film must
be registered with the United States Copyright Office, and the security interest must be
recorded in the same office."), affd, 161 B.R. 50 (BAP. 9th Cir. 1993). For secondary
sources discussing that point, see, for example, Melvin Simensky & Howard A. Gootdin,
Liberating Untapped Millions for Investment Collatera The Arrival of Security Interests in Intangible
Assets, in THE Nov ROLE OF INTELLECrUAL PROPERTY IN COMMERCIAL TRANsAcnONS: RECENT
TRENDs IN THE VALUATION, EXPLOITATION AND PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 453,
463-66 (Melvin Simensky & Lanning G. Bryer eds., 1994), Haemmerli, supra note 16, at
1666-67, 1694, and Kenneth P. Wilcox & Dennis J. White, Practical Problems with Intellectual
Property as Collateral, COM. LENDING REv., Summer 1996, at 12, 18.
56 It is important to emphasize the limited value of registration. Since the United
States adhered to the Berne Convention, registration has become little more than an
archaic formality, providing no important substantive benefits to the copyright holder
(aside from the ability to grant a security interest under the Copyright Act). See MERGES ET
AL., supra note 16, at 345, 349-50.
57 See, e.g., Montgomery v. Noga, 168 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir. 1999) (analyzing copyright
protection of a software program for which the developer did not register any version
earlier than version 2.9a).
58 See Passela Interview, supra note 11 (transcript at 4) (preferring periodic filings);
Forrester Interview, supra note 31 (transcript at 11) (requiring quarterly filings); Radcliffe
Interview, supra note 16 (transcript at 3) (requiring or recommending filings "at least once
a quarter"); see also White Interview, supra note 31 (transcript at 3) (statement of exper-
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security interest would not extend to the developments made during
the current calendar quarter.59
That is not to say that the lender has nothing in that case. Pre-
sumably the newer version of the software includes many things car-
ried over from the older version. 60 And the lender's perfected
interest in all of those carried-over features entitles it to some indeter-
minate share of revenues from any use of the newer version.61 But
"some indeterminate share of revenues" from the debtor's assets is not
the goal of the lender making a development loan. Again, the diffi-
culty of finding any method that protects the lender entirely leads
many lenders (especially on the East Coast) to forgo any sustained
effort to comply with the federal copyright filing requirements. 62
4. What Do You Get Without Licensor Consent?
A final difficulty for the software lender-the limited ability to
take control of the collateral upon default by the borrower-comes as
something of a surprise. Commercial-transactions scholars tend to as-
sume that a borrower always has the power to grant a security interest
in its assets and that a foreclosure of that interest will transfer the
borrower's interest to the lender.63
That basic premise, however, is completely foreign to the commu-
nity of intellectual-property practitioners, which strongly disfavors
transfers by a licensee without the consent of the licensor, even if the
transfer is limited to the licensee's rights under the license. For exam-
ple, in Everex Systems, Inc. v. Cadtrak Corp. (In re CFLC, Inc.), in which a
bankrupt patent licensee tried to transfer its rights under the license,
the Ninth Circuit explained what it perceived to be the adverse policy
consequences of a contrary view:
[E]very licensee would become a potential competitor with the li-
censor-patent holder in the market for licenses under the patents.
And while the patent holder could presumably control the absolute
ienced lawyer) (suggesting that a requirement of filings every six to twelve months is
typical).
59 See C Tek Software, Inc. v. New York State Bus. Venture Partnership (In re C Tek
Software, Inc.), 127 B.R. 501 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1991) (holding that perfected security inter-
est in version 3.7.2B of borrower's software did not entitle creditor to improvements re-
flected in version 418 in use at the time of the borrower's bankruptcy); see also Radcliffe
Interview, supra note 16 (transcript at 3) (describing a loan perfected only in the "delta" of
the new version of the software).
60 Think how much of Windows 95 carried over to Windows 98.
61 See Montgomery, 168 F.3d at 1291-93 (holding that the use of version 4.3 of an unreg-
istered software program infringed the registered copyright in version 2.9a of the same
program).
62 See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
63 See, e.g., U.C.C. § 9-408(a) (generally rendering ineffective contract terms that bar
creation of security interests in intangible property).
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number of licenses in existence under a free-assignability regime, it
would lose the very important ability to control the identity of its
licensees. Thus, any license a patent holder granted-even to the
smallest firm in the product market most remote from its own-
would be fraught with the danger that the licensee would assign it
to the patent holder's most serious competitor, a party whom the
patent holder itself might be absolutely unwilling to license. 64
Similar concerns trouble software licensors. In their case, the
principal goal of transferability restrictions is to protect their pricing
structures, which offer deep discounts for volume purchasers. If a li-
censee of a large number of copies of a software program could carve
that license up into several smaller licenses, it could sell those smaller
licenses at prices greater than the price it paid, yet still below the price
charged by the licensor.65 Thus, large licensors tend to forbid trans-
fers of their software by their licensees.66
The question then arises: If a licensee cannot transfer its rights
under the license without the consent of the licensor, can the licensee
grant an effective security interest to a lender that finances the licen-
see's acquisition of the software? In the modern world in which a
grant of a security interest is viewed as a transfer to the lender of some
partial interest in (or rights against) the collateral, the logic of Everex6 7
suggests that a lender could not enforce a security interest if the licen-
sor has not consented. Although there has been no judicial analysis of
the permissibility of such an interest as a matter of federal law,68 the
drafters of revised Article 9 of the UCC have responded to the con-
cerns of licensors by including provisions that firmly bar any enforce-
64 89 F.3d 673, 679 (9th Cir. 1996); see also In re Patient Educ. Media, Inc., 210 B.R.
237, 242-43 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1997) (applying the Everex holding to a nonexclusive license
of copyrighted videotapes).
65 See McAuley Interview, supra note 10 (transcript at 4-5) (discussing the importance
of tiered pricing in the sale of Microsoft software); Guiste Interview, supra note 11 (tran-
script at 2) ("[W]e would sell to the large area resaler at a different price if they are going
to turn around and resell to Chevron than what we would if they were going to turn
around and sell to Bob's Auto who wants 20 licenses.").
66 One interesting exception proves the rule. Microsoft's open license program used
for a licensee with fewer than 1000 desktops permits the licensee to transfer its interest en
masse to a third party. Because the transfer must be en masse, the program ensures that
the third party is using a quantity of the software consistent with the price paid to Microsoft
for the original license. See McAuley Interview, supra note 10 (transcript at 4-5); see also
Bazrod Interview, supra note 9 (transcript at 10) (describing a software lender's recogni-
tion of the free transferability of certain Microsoft Office licenses). Transfer is particularly
easy for Microsoft software because of the readily available support and maintenance serv-
ices from third-party providers. See McAuley Interview, supra note 10 (transcript at 6-7).
67 See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
68 The general view seems to be that such an interest would be prohibited. See Wil-
liam S. Veatch, Venture Leasing & Software Leasing, in 3 EQUIPMENT LEASING 31A-1, I
31A.06[3], at 31A-12 to 31A-13 (JeffreyJ. Wong ed., 1999) (relying on Everex to support the
view that "a licensee cannot effectively... grant remarketing rights to a secured party...
without the licensor's consent").
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ment of such an interest without the licensor's consent. Specifically,
section 9-408(d) of the UCC includes a laundry list of things not re-
quired of the licensor when a lender takes a security interest in the
face of a contrary provision in a license.69 Among other things, such a
security interest does not require the licensor to recognize the
lender's rights, 70 does not entitle the secured party to use the
software, 7' and does not even entitle the secured party to enforce the
security interest or otherwise assign the right to use the software.
Hence, Article 9 permits the user to grant a security interest without
the licensor's consent, but at the same time deprives the security inter-
est of any operative significance.
Unfortunately, even though the provisions of Article 9 appear to
accommodate every legitimate interest of the licensor, rigorous appli-
cation of the logic of Everex would bar software licensees from grant-
ing security interests not permitted by the terms of their licenses.
What that means for software lending is pretty clear: unlike most lend-
ers, if a lender funding a user's software acquisitions wants to be sure
that it has any of the typical attributes of a secured lender, it needs to
obtain consent from the third-party licensor that owns the underlying
copyrighted software. The need for that consent makes it much more
difficult for the lender to obtain a right to liquidate intellectual prop-
erty than a right to liquidate any other common business asset.
To put the general point bluntly, the filing and perfection system
for copyrightable assets is so ill-suited to modem commercial lending
transactions that even well-counseled lenders on substantial transac-
tions often find that it is not cost effective to comply with the system
sufficiently to obtain a perfected security interest in their collateral.
II
SOFTWARE-DEVELOPMENT LENDING
Given the practical and legal obstacles discussed in Part I, the
casual theorist would predict a limited role for asset-based debt on the
balance sheets of companies dependent on software. From that per-
spective, the limited ability of a lender to obtain an enforceable right
to liquidate a valuable asset should deter the asset-based lender, leav-
ing the field to equity investors of various kinds or, in the case of the
most creditworthy companies, general unsecured debt unrelated to
specific assets of the company.72
69 U.C.C. § 9-408(d).
70 See id. §9-408(d)(3).
71 See id. §9-408(d)(4).
72 See Mann, supra note 3, at 668-74 (analyzing the use of umsecured debt by
creditworthy companies).
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As it happens, however, the actual lending markets in our econ-
omy contradict that perspective. Indeed, it would be only a slight ex-
aggeration to say that the problems lenders face in obtaining
repayment by liquidating software are irrelevant to the lending mar-
ket. The main difficulty is not the impossibility of lending in the area,
but rather the need to adapt traditional lending models to the unu-
sual dynamics of software as an asset.73 Software-based lending is a
new field, because software itself has emerged only recently as a valua-
ble business asset. As a new field, it requires new techniques and ap-
proaches, different from those developed over decades of practice
related to more traditional assets. Thus, as with any developing mar-
ket niche, different lenders will have different approaches to the area
at any given time. 74 Some lenders will concentrate on the new field,
develop expertise, and lead the way to a new lending product. Others
will wait to enter the field until the lending practices and business
models become more stable.
Even looking at the practices already in place, it is clear that the
industry can overcome the difficulties of software-based lending in at
least two broad categories of transactions. This Part discusses the first
of those two categories-loans to fund the development of new
software products. Part III discusses the second-loans to fund the
acquisition of software.
A. The Basic Transaction
I start with the software-development lending transaction because
it is the more difficult. A business seeking funds for software develop-
ment faces not only most of the general problems discussed in Part I,
but also the likelihood that the business might have little or no reve-
nue available to service debt during the development stage. To make
matters worse, the typical software developer often will not have signif-
icant tangible assets to bolster the liquidation value of the collateral it
can offer to a lender. Indeed, to the extent that the business has any
tangible equipment, it is likely to be computer equipment with high
rates of obsolescence, specialization, and other features that make liq-
uidation problematic.75
73 See Interview with Mark A. Kielb, CEO, IA Inc., in Ann Arbor, Mich. (Nov. 10, 1998)
[hereinafter Kielb Interview] (notes of interview on file with author) (explaining that
Michigan banks' lack of familiarity with software companies limits their willingness to make
loans that would be profitable for a bank more familiar with the financial circumstances of
such companies).
74 I examined a similar phenomenon-what appears to me to be the declining use of
collateral in bank lending to small businesses-in Mann, Small-Business Secured Credi supra
note 5, at 26-36.
75 See Ronald J. Mann, Strategy and Force in the Liquidation of Secured Deb, 96 MNCH. L.
REv. 159, 181 & n.79 (1997) (recounting an incident in which a bank declined to repossess
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Current accounting conventions exacerbate the problem by un-
derstating the financial position of such companies. Specifically, they
make it quite hard to capitalize expenditures on developing software.
Absent unusual circumstances, companies must treat those expendi-
tures as periodic expenditures for accounting purposes. The result is
that a company with a substantial investment in developing a valuable
asset still might show almost no assets on its balance sheet.76
To be sure, a sophisticated lender would look beyond the formal
balance sheet to the "true" value of the partially developed software.
But only a sophisticated lender will be as comfortable looking past the
balance sheet for a novel asset like software (and ignoring the lack of
accounting-recognized assets) as it might be with a more conventional
asset like a new piece of production machinery. That result limits the
universe of financial institutions willing to consider software-develop-
ment loans to those quite experienced in the field.7 7
The general solution to the capital requirements of those busi-
nesses is a substantial external equity investment from venture-capital
or angel investors.78 As other scholars have explained in numerous
studies on the venture-capital market, venture-capital firms raise funds
from groups of investors-both individuals and institutions-and
pool those funds into a single entity that invests in a number of portfo-
lio companies. 79 The portfolio companies typically are development-
stage, high-tech companies with an idea that might turn out to be
either extremely valuable or worthless.8 0
retail computers notwithstanding fraud by the borrower, because of the lender's assess-
ment that it would incur large losses if it attempted to resell the computers).
76 See Kielb Interview, supra note 73.
77 See id.
78 1 have not been able to locate statistics specific to software-related venture-capital
investments. One analyst, however, states that 61% of 1998 venture-capital investments
were in "information technology, home to the red-hot Internet sector." Joshua Harris
Prager, Venture Capitalists Buy Stakes in Public Biotech Firms, WALL ST. J., Feb. 2, 1999, at B2.
The best available statistics describe the entire industry. See Bernard S. Black & RonaldJ.
Gilson, Venture Capital and the Structure of Capital Markets: Banks Versus Stock Markets, 47 J.
FIN. ECON. 243, 247 & fig.1 (1998) (reporting statistics on domestic venture-capital invest-
ments from 1978 to the mid-1990s, with new capital investments averaging more than $4
billion per year during 1995 and 1996); Prager, supra (reporting total venture-capital in-
vestments in 1998 of $12.2 billion in 1776 different deals-an average of just under $7
million per deal).
79 See, e.g., Black & Gilson, supra note 78, at 249 tbl.3 (presenting statistics on typical
sources of funds for venture capitalists); CurtisJ. Milhaupt, The Market for Innovation in the
United States and Japan: Venture Capital and the Comparative Corporate Governance Debate, 91
Nw. U. L. Ruv. 865, 880-82 (1997) (discussing sources of venture-capital funding in the
United States); William A. Sahlman, The Structure and Governance of Venture-Capital Organiza-
tions, 27J. FIN. ECON. 473, 487-93 (1990) (describing and analyzing the typical structural
arrangements between venture capitalists and their investors).
80 See, e.g., Black & Gilson, supra note 78, at 250 tbl.4 (presenting statistics on typical
uses of funds raised by venture capitalists); Milhaupt, supra note 79, at 876-79 (contrasting
the startup-related investments typical of American venture capital with the more conserva-
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Scholars have paid particular attention to how the parties to a
venture-capital arrangement deal with conflicting incentives and with
the potential agency costs associated with that conflict to undermine
profitability of arrangements. The typical venture-capital arrange-
ment is designed to limit several distinct potential agency costs: (1)
the risk that the venture capitalist will favor itself over its investors (for
example, in its decisions as to which potential portfolio companies will
be placed in which funds), (2) the risk that the entrepreneur manag-
ing the portfolio company will shirk, and (3) the risk that the venture
capitalist will treat the portfolio company unfairly.81
Although the story of equity investments in those companies has
been told frequently and analyzed in detail, little or nothing has been
written about the role of debt investments in them. Despite the ab-
sence of scholarly discussion, debt investment in development-stage
software companies is a significant phenomenon.8 2 As suggested in
Part I, those transactions formally are secured loans, but the benefits
of the collateral are so minimal that lenders often do not even bother
to perfect their security interests.83 To put it more pointedly, those
transactions involve loans to small, start-up companies, yet the benefit
of a security interest in the principal asset of those companies is not
substantial enough to justify the costs of filing.
The first key to those loans is the surprising fact that even devel-
opment-stage software companies often have sufficient revenues to
service substantial amounts of debt. For example, one banker exper-
ienced in the area advised me (perhaps with some excessive opti-
mism) that more than eighty percent of companies that reach the
venture-capital stage eventually develop sufficient revenues-usually
from pilot projects selling their product or service on an introductory
basis-to cover debt service on some type of lending arrangement.84
ive portfolio choices of Japanese venture capitalists); Sahlman, supra note 79, at 506-14
(describing and analyzing the typical arrangements between venture capitalists and their
portfolio companies).
81 For discussion of that literature, see Mann, Verification Institutions, supra note 5, at
2250-51.
82 The market for lending in this context does not seem to distinguish between
software-development companies and other enterprises dependent on intellectual prop-
erty, such as biotechnology companies. Thus, the analysis of this Part applies as well to
development-stage, patent-dependent companies. A broader picture of patent-related
lending, however, is beyond the scope of this Article.
83 See Technology-Bank Emerging-Business Lender Interview, supra note 42 (tran-
script at 11) ("[E]verything we do is secured lending ... and by the way we do get a
security interest in all of the business assets .... ."); supra Part I.-1 (discussing the short
half-life of software liquidation value).
84 See Technology-Bank Credit Officer Interview, supra note 42 (transcript at 3) (dis-
cussing bank's reliance on revenues from beta and post-beta versions of software); For-
rester Interview, supra note 31 (transcript at 6-7).
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Another banker specializing in loans to development-stage, tech-
nology-based companies had a similar perspective.85 He viewed the
lack of cash flow not so much as an obstacle for technology companies
as a feature of a particular stage of all young companies. 86 In his view,
the funding of the company at an early stage-before any revenues
exist-is properly (and normally) provided by equity investors.8 7
Bank lending "kicks in ... when the company gets beyond their devel-
opment cycle ... and they begin to ship a product."88
Those revenues provide a substantial lending opportunity geared
to a bank's customary focus on debt-service coverage, at a relatively
modest interest rate.89 Even if the underlying asset has slight liquida-
tion value, a loan to fund general working-capital needs often has a
satisfactory likelihood of repayment90 if it can be matched against a
revenue stream that provides adequate coverage for periodic interest
payments on the debt.91 Although the analysis in Part I should make
the point clear, it is important to note that my interview subjects
agreed that their lending relies on that revenue stream for repayment,
not on the value of any underlying collateral.92 In particular, my in-
terview subjects expressed surprisingly little concern about the safety
of their lending programs, while at the same time agreeing that pros-
pects for liquidating the assets of their working-capital borrowers were
bleak.93
Because of the high cost of developing new technology, many
technology-based companies have a desire for more general working-
85 See Trachy Interview, supra note 9 (transcript at 1-2).
86 See id.
87 See id.
88 Id. (transcript at 2). The idea that bank lending is a regular feature of such compa-
nies is supported by the only quantitative analysis of the question that I have been able to
locate. SeeJeffrey J. Trester, Venture Capital Contracting Under Asymmetric Information, 22 J.
BAr~u'NG & FiN. 675, 693 & tbl.12 (1998) (presenting data indicating that 43.1% of later-
stage, venture-capital-financed software-development companies have third-party debt).
89 See Forrester Interview, supra note 31 (transcript at 4) (stating that interest rates are
in the range of prime plus one or two percent per annum).
90 The loss rate on those loans is quite modest, generally in a range below 50 basis
points-less than one half of one percent. See Technology-Bank Credit Officer Interview,
supra note 42 (transcript at 7-8); Forrester Interview, supra note 31 (transcript at 5). To put
that figure in perspective, the net rate of loans charged off for all FDIC-insured national
banks in 1997 was 71 basis points-just under three-quarters of one percent. See Condition
and Performance of Commercial Banks, Q.J. (Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Wash-
ington, D.C.), June 1998, at 1, 5.
91 See Forrester Interview, supra note 31 (transcript at 3-4) (describing the niche for
lending based on those revenues); see also Mann, Small-Business Secured Credit, supra note 5,
at 18 n.67 (describing that rationale for loans to small businesses more generally).
92 See, e.g., Technology-Bank Credit Officer Interview, supra note 42 (transcript at 1)
(suggesting that "our collateral is essentially nothing more [than the likelihood of repay-
ment from internal funding or further equity contributions]").
93 See, e.g., Trachy Interview, supra note 9 (transcript at 1-2) (describing reliance on
cash flow from operations).
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capital debt than traditional lending ratios would justify based on the
revenues generated by the sale of pilot-stage products and services.
For those companies, traditional working-capital financing might be
insufficient. The presence of a venture capitalist, however, often con-
vinces banks to increase the amount and accelerate the timing of the
lending that they provide. Thus, at least some banks are willing to
provide funding as soon as the venture capitalist invests, even if the
company has no revenues at that time.94
Although they differed on exactly why the presence of a venture
capitalist makes transactions safe enough for a bank to go forward, the
bankers to whom I spoke generally emphasized two points: an en-
hanced exit opportunity and confidence in the merits of the bor-
rower. The exit strategy arises from the likelihood that the venture
capitalist will provide or arrange future equity funding for the portfo-
lio company. Interestingly, the venture capitalist apparently does not
offer any formal legal commitment that it will repay the bank's loan or
otherwise advance funds to the portfolio company; as a legal matter,
future funding obligations fall almost entirely within the venture capi-
talist's discretion.95 To the extent the bank relies on the prospect of
future funds from the venture capitalist, it relies at least in part on the
informal sanction to the venture capitalist's reputation if the venture
capitalist fails to provide the funding that the bank expects based on
customary industry practices.
94 See Stephanie T. Gates, Startup Finance: Debt Financingfor YoungPrivate Companies Is a
Trend That Can't Last, RED HERRING, Jan. 1999, at 98, 98 (reporting the existence of "banks
willing to make loans to startups" as soon as the startups "clos[e] an initial round of ven-
ture funding"); Kathleen Borie, Financing Emerging Companies-Equity vs. Debt (Jan. 11,
1999) (visited Sept. 3, 1999) <http://www.garage.com/forums/commercialBanking/
1999.01.11./article.shtmnl> (discussing the life cycle of financing emerging companies, and
explaining that "[d]ebt providers will typically provide financing once the company has
received angel or venture capital (VC) funding"); Technology-Bank Credit Officer Inter-
view, supra note 42 (transcript at 1) (explaining willingness to lend "a fraction of what the
venture-capitalist community has put in to it," even though "the company is probably not
even in a revenue state much less a profitability stage").
95 The parties with whom I spoke considered their actual documentation proprietary,
but their comments make it clear that the venture capitalist provides no formal written
guaranty. Rather, lenders rely on vaguer commitments that are at best indirectly enforcea-
ble. See Technology-Bank Emerging-Business Lender Interview, supra note 42 (transcript at
4-5) (admitting that the bank normally does not get a guaranty from the venture capital-
ist); Interview with Technology-Bank General Counsel, in Santa Clara, Cal. (Nov. 12, 1998)
[hereinafter Technology-Bank General Counsel Interview] (transcript at 1-2, on file with
author) (discussing "comfort letters" issued by venture capitalists and doubts about the
extent to which those letters impose a legal obligation on venture capitalists); Passela Inter-
view, supra note 11 (transcript at 2) ("[M]e don't [get a guaranty or other commitment
from the venture capitalists], but we do talk to them and do ask what their commitment is
to the company and.., that they would be willing to ... support growth should it be
needed."); Forrester Interview, supra note 31 (transcript at 5) (indicating reliance on "cash
flow of the investment cycle" rather than on receivables).
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The structure of the transaction also bolsters the likelihood that
future funding to repay the bank will be forthcoming. For one thing,
the bank is sure to be paid in any case in which the company proceeds
far enough to make a public offering.96 But even if the firm does not
succeed in reaching that stage, the venture capitalist must continue
funding the borrower if it hopes even to recoup its initial investment.
Lenders understand well the difference between their debt invest-
ments and the venture capitalists' equity investments: "[W] e are rely-
ing very heavily on their need to succeed by getting their money out
.... They get nothing until we get everything."97
That dynamic provides the bank two successful exit strategies
from portfolio companies that do not go public. First, the venture
capitalist might pay off the bank directly with a new investment into
the project, a course that enhances the venture capitalist's general
control over the situation.98 Alternatively, the venture capitalist might
pay the bank upon the sale of the failing enterprise's product to a
competing enterprise. Interestingly, such sales seem to be fairly com-
mon, even when the enterprise is failing, apparently because of signifi-
cant off-balance-sheet assets-either the value of the user base that
the enterprise has developed 99 or the stable of talented software devel-
opers employed by the company. 00 In practice, banks' low rate of
losses suggests that only a very small number of portfolio companies
to which they loan money fail to reach a point at which one of those
exit strategies is available.
The other main benefit that the venture capitalist brings to the
transaction is assistance in identifying borrowers that are less likely to
default. For example, officers at one institution emphasized the im-
portance of the venture capitalist's analysis of the credibility of the
portfolio company. Basically, a determination by a reputable venture
96 See Forrester Interview, supra note 31 (transcript at 4-5).
97 Technology-Bank Credit Officer Interview, supra note 42 (transcript at 5); see also
Mann, Verification Institutions, supra note 5, at 2251 (explaining how the structure of ven-
ture-capital investments makes it quite difficult for venture capitalists to abandon their
portfolio companies); Technology-Bank Credit Officer Interview, supra note 42 (transcript
at 1) ("[We will lend a fraction of what they put in, so they have much more skin in the
game than we do and they get none of their money back until we get all of our money
back... And we like the motive of the venture capitalists to try to make sure we get out so
that they get something."); Technology-Bank General Counsel Interview, supra note 95
(transcript at 1-2) (discussing the importance of relationships in assessing the commitment
of the venture capitalist to fund); Passela Interview, supra note 11 (transcript at 2) (describ-
ing reliance on implicit commitment of venture capitalists to continue funding).
98 Cf Mann, supra note 3, at 641 n.59 (discussing an interview presenting a similar
rationale for a senior lender's desire to avoid dealing with subordinate lenders).
99 See Forrester Interview, supra note 31 (transcript at 4) (emphasizing the value to a
competitor of the "installed base" of users of the borrower's software product).
100 Although a number of my interview subjects made that point indirectly, Robert
Gomulkiewicz at Microsoft specifically pointed it out to me in our informal conversation.
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capitalist that a particular company warrants investment provides con-
siderable validation of the portfolio company's business plan.101 Pig-
gybacking on the venture capitalist's determination, the bank often is
willing to fund a considerable percentage of the amount invested by
the venture capitalist, even before the firm develops revenues suffi-
cient to support a conventional working-capital loan.10 2 One lender
put it succinctly: "[I]f [a prominent venture capitalist] puts in five or
ten million dollars it is not really rocket science for the bank to layer
on a piece of debt onto that."'03
A final theme emphasized by lenders is the likelihood that, dur-
ing the development stage, the venture capitalist will monitor the firm
carefully to prevent a total loss of its investment. 10 4 Similarly, banks
101 See Technology-Bank Credit Officer Interview, supra note 42 (transcript at 1) (em-
phasizing the importance of the venture capitalist's "due diligence" in assessing the likeli-
hood that the borrower has substantial "enterprise value"); Technology-Bank Emerging-
Business Lender Interview, supra note 42 (transcript at 1) (explaining the importance of
"validation of the product market in the industry... because those [i.e., the venture capi-
talists] are the experts"). The rationale for that validation is tied to the venture capitalist's
long-term business, which depends on a continuing capacity to raise new funds from inves-
tors: the venture capitalist depends heavily on its reputation for picking winners. That
reputation dependency is evident to a bank; the bank therefore naturally relies on the
venture capitalist's views as credible.
102 See Gates, supra note 94, at 98 ("'We leverage off the experts.'" (quoting a senior
vice president at Silicon Valley Bank)); Technology-Bank Emerging-Business Lender Inter-
view, supra note 42 (transcript at 1) ("The bank's model ... is ... to lever off of the
intellectual capacity of the venture-capital community and partner with that capacity and
bank companies from the point of [the first venture-capital] funding forward.").
103 Technology-Bank Emerging-Business Lender Interview, supra note 42 (transcript at
1). The heavy emphasis on reputation extends not only to venture capitalists themselves,
but also to other members of the portfolio company's management team. See Kathleen
Borie, Debt Financing for Emerging Growth Companies (May 13, 1998) (visited Sept. 3, 1999)
<http://www.garage.com/foruns/commercialBanking/1998.05. 13.article.shtml> (noting
the importance to a bank's assessment of a potential startup loan of "who's in the deal-
management and equity partners"); Technology-Bank Credit Officer Interview, supra note
42 (transcript at 4-5) ("We see CFOs company after company, CEOs, Chief Technical Of-
ficers, whatever, company after company and when we have the opportunity to [get] com-
fortable with those individuals-these are people who are can-do, success-oriented people
who can build a team around them.... [T]hat is very important and is an indicator for
US.").
104 For a discussion of the importance of venture-capitalist monitoring, see Milhaupt,
supra note 79, at 875-76. The strong reliance on monitoring by venture capitalists was
underscored by the concern one interview subject expressed about a potential borrower
whose venture capitalists had not obtained majority ownership of the borrower. He
explained:
[I]t is a personal opinion of mine when I don't see a majority ownership
with the VCs [venture capitalists] it is-that's a place where you have to
spend a little more time on the due diligence and trying to understand the
capabilities and the competence of management because they are the deci-
sion makers in that case.
They are very economic and I mean emotion does not get into the equation
very often, as it would with an entrepreneur, this is a. .. I mean the VCs
are predictable in how they react and it is always in their own best interest
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typically rely, at least in part, on the expertise and control of the ven-
ture capitalist in helping the borrower through the development
stage. 105
Collectively, those points reveal a fascinating structure, in which
the bank fosters a robust relation with the venture capitalist to com-
pensate for the weakness of the bank's debt-based remedies against
the portfolio company. Through that relation, the bank can use the
venture capitalist's effective equity-based ability to control the portfo-
lio company's assets to extract the value attributable to the underlying
software assets-the value that the bank's lending helps create, but
which the bank never could extract on its own. From an institutional
perspective, it would not be inaccurate to say that the bank uses the
venture capitalist as an agent to collect its debt from the portfolio
company.
B. The Role of the Bank
Although the foregoing discussion should make it clear that the
bank benefits considerably from the venture capitalist's presence in
the transaction, it is not nearly so clear what the bank brings to the
transaction that the venture capitalist cannot. One obvious answer is
that the portfolio company is likely to prefer to fund as much of its
capital needs with debt as it practicably can.10 6 In this context, the
lender helps to fund the portfolio company's acquisition of low-return
assets. The venture capitalist's relatively risky equity investments are
geared to extraordinarily high rates of return (in the range of 100%
per annum). As a result, portfolio companies are reluctant to expend
the equity infused by a venture capitalist to acquire low-tech assets on
which such a high rate of return is most unlikely.10 7 Because the typi-
cal bank is happy with a much lower return (i.e., a few points above
and self-interest which generally we will make sure that we are where we
need to be.
Forrester Interview, supra note 31 (transcript at 10).
105 See Passela Interview, supra note 11 (transcript at 2).
106 See generally Alan Schwartz, A Theory of Loan Priorities, 18J. LEGAL STuD. 209, 226-28
(1989) (providing a theoretical explanation of reasons why entrepreneurs might prefer
debt financing to equity financing).
107 See Gates, supra note 94, at 98 ("VCs are happy to get additional cheap capital for
their portfolio companies and.., leverage their own equity investment for greater re-
turn."); Borie, supra note 103 ("Debt financing enables a company to 'stretch' its equity
dollars ... ."); Technology-Bank Emerging-Business Lender Interview, supra note 42 (tran-
script at 5) ("[T]he bank can help the company by not tying up... very expensive equity
... stuff that has a very low return on equity invested dollars... ."). One lender explained
that the distinction between bank and equity investment also relates to the residual value
created by the investment. See Technology-Bank Emerging-Business Lender Interview,
supra note 42 (transcript at 11) ("[If you are going to buy a PC, bank debt. If you are
going to develop a marketing campaign, probably equity dollars because there is no asset
there.").
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prime after losses), it is easy for the bank to earn a profit by providing
a funding source that can be used for ordinary business expenses,
such as furnishing expenses and similar petty expenditures. 0 8 Thus,
the complete structure is symbiotic: the lender and the equity investor
each obtains significant benefits from the participation of the other in
financing a software company.10 9
That answer poses an obvious further question: Why does the ven-
ture capitalist need to involve the bank instead of funding the loan
itself? A variety of practical concerns limits the feasibility of venture-
capitalist lending as a substitute for bank involvement. For one thing,
the two investors have different skills. For example, the bank's in-
volvement with later-stage portfolio companies centers on the revolv-
ing funding of short-term receivables. To do that funding safely
requires considerable expertise, which banks are much more likely to
possess than venture capitalists. 110 Also, because the venture capitalist
presumably would have to borrow the money itself to lend to the port-
folio company, it is likely that such an arrangement would have signifi-
candy higher transaction costs than a direct loan to the borrower.111
Finally, even if the venture capitalist could obtain funds at a net
cost as low as that of a bank willing to advance funds directly to the
108 See Technology-Bank Emerging-Business Lender Interview, supra note 42 (tran-
script at 5).
109 One lender explained his firm's benefits to the venture capitalist as follows: "[11f
we... as a bank... can get the prime or prime-plus-one-return as opposed to the 100%
per annum return that you demand and help you lever that company to go a little bit
further in their development-that helps everyone." Id.; see also Borie, supra note 103 (at-
tributing the emergence of successful bank lending to early-stage technology companies to
"[I]ong term strategic relationships between lenders and investors").
110 See Interview with Gary Wyner, President of Monetrex, Inc., in West Bloomfield,
Mich. (Oct. 28, 1998) (no transcript available). For formal models designed to demon-
strate that venture capitalists would not be willing to use debt in their funding of their
portfolio companies, see Trester, supra note 88, at 677. Dirk Bergemann and Ulrich Hege
present a model indicating that venture capitalists should take convertible securities. See
Dirk Bergemann & Ulrich Hege, Venture Capital Financing, Moral Hazard, and Learning, 22J.
BANKING & FIN. 703, 722-23 (1998). As Josh Lerner explains, however, Bergemann and
Hege's analysis is "quite unrealistic," because it ignores the venture capitalist's monitoring
activities. Joshua Lerner, Comment on Bergemann and Hege, 22 J. BANKING & FIN. 736, 738
(1998).
111 Although the mundane costs of processing the transaction certainly could be mini-
mized through routinization, the introduction of the venture capitalist into the funding
process is likely to add a less tractable cost from increased risk. The difficulty is that the
venture capitalist-albeit more creditworthy than its portfolio companies-is by no means
a risk-free entity. Hence, a loan to the venture capitalist from an institutional lender
doubtless would include some premium for risk above the lender's own cost of funds and
desired rate of return on the transaction. As a result, the cost of funds obtained through
venture-capitalist borrowing followed by on-lending to portfolio companies would be
higher than the cost of funds loaned directly to the portfolio company. Theoretically, the
venture capitalist might be able to avoid those costs by using a portion of the funding
obtained from its investors as debt. That course, however, seems likely to further compli-
cate the already difficult relations between the venture capitalist and its investors.
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borrower, it is doubtful that the venture capitalist could compete suc-
cessfully against the bank in pricing such a transaction. The bank has
an advantage inherent in its ability to profit from the relationship
through nonlending services that it can provide the portfolio com-
pany for cash-management and account-related matters. The antici-
pated profits from those services typically are reflected in lower
nominal pricing of the bank's loans.'1 2 Similarly, the bank's ability to
monitor expenditures through disbursements from an account main-
tained at the bank gives the bank a low-cost monitoring procedure
difficult for venture capitalists to imitate." 3
C. Possible Limitations
Although the foregoing portrays an apparently successful lending
niche, the dependency of that arrangement on venture capitalists sug-
gests caution in extrapolating to a general view that it is easy for a
software-development company to obtain loans to fund working-capi-
tal needs. First, that particular type of lending must stand or fall with
the continued existence of something much like the venture-capital
investment cycle as we know it. As the literature on comparative cor-
porate governance has begun to demonstrate, the structure of our
venture-capital investment cycle appears to be highly contingent on
factors not yet completely understood." 4 Thus, it is entirely possible
that venture-capital investment as we now know it could disappear
quite rapidly.115
Second, although overall investments have been rising recently,
venture capital funds only a tiny portion of the small innovation-based
enterprises in our economy, in the range of only one thousand per
year.116 To be sure, for many companies, the unavailability of venture-
112 See Technology-Bank Emerging-Business Lender Interview, supra note 42 (tran-
script at 10-11) (discussing the bank's focus in its pricing on the profitability of the entire
relationship with the portfolio company).
113 See id. (transcript at 9-10) (describing the bank's process for comparing the rate of
capital dissipation to the anticipated schedule for completion of the financed project).
114 See, e.g., Black & Gilson, supra note 78, at 265-74 (arguing that venture capital is
more vital in stock-market-centered financial systems than in bank-centered capital mar-
kets); Milhaupt, supra note 79, at 879-98 (arguing that the venture-capital market in the
United States is more vital than the one in Japan, because of its focus on market rather
than bank governance mechanisms); Ronald J. Gilson, The Legal Infrastructure of High
Technology Industrial Districts: Silicon Valley, Route 128, and Covenants Not to Compete
(July 14, 1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (arguing that Silicon Val-
ley's technology industry persists in part because of California's prohibition of covenants
not to compete).
115 See, e.g., Gates, supra note 94, at 98 ("Debt financing for startups is beginning to dry
up in response to the turbulence of the public markets, the hedge-fund fallout, the insta-
bility of international loans by large banks, and inactivity in the high-yield markets."). As
the text suggests, I disagree with that assessment.
116 See Sahlman, supra note 79, at 475-82 (reporting statistics that suggest a limited role
of venture-capital funding for new businesses as a whole); Prager, supra note 78, at B2
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capital fimding reflects an accurate judgment that the chances of suc-
cess are too small to make investment prudent.117 But in some cases,
the lack of venture-capital funding rests at least in part on factors
other than the likelihood of success, such as geographic location or an
inadequate expectation of a large profit (a disqualifying factor quite
different from an inadequate expected rate of return). 1 " Indeed,
venture capitalists generally are interested only in companies that
need relatively large cash infusions, so that a firm needing only a mil-
lion dollars need not apply!119 The general reason for that seems to
be that it is not effective for a venture capitalist to commit resources to
investigate the prospects of a firm that does not require a substantial
cash infusion. 120 For the firms that fail to obtain venture-capital back-
ing, the limited availability of working-capital financing from banks
may pose a significant barrier to development.
It is difficult to assess the effect of that barrier. For one thing, it is
clear that bank lending in the area is not strictly limited to venture-
backed companies. For example, both of the Route 128 lenders to
whom I spoke indicated that loans to companies without venture
backing, although uncommon, were not unheard of.12 ' More impor-
(reporting 1776 venture-capital investments in small businesses in 1998); Forrester Inter-
view, supra note 31 (transcript at 1-2) (suggesting that there were only three to five hun-
dred new venture-backed companies per year in the early 1990s).
117 SeeJoshua Lerner, "Angel" Financing and Public Policy: An Overview, 22 J. BANKING &
FiN. 773, 777-79 (1998) (arguing that the withholding of venture-capital investments reflect
real problems with potential startups rather than a shortage.of funds available for invest-
ment). The significant connection in our economy between the rate of innovation and the
favorability of the legal climate toward venture-capital fundraising supports that view. See
Samuel Kortum &Josh Lerner, Does Venture Capital Spur Innovation? (unpublished man-
uscript, on file with author) (examining the influence of venture capital on patented in-
ventions in the United States across 20 industries and over three decades).
118 See, e.g., Josh Lemer, Venture Capitalists and the Oversight of Private Firms, 50 J. FIN.
301, 312-15 (1995) (presenting empirical evidence of a statistically significant relationship
between the likelihood that a venture capitalist sits on the board of a firm and the distance
between the firm's location and the venture capitalist's headquarters); Sahlman, supra note
79, at 475-87 (discussing generally the types of businesses in which venture capitalists invest
and their limited role in capital formation).
119 One lender explained:
It is very difficult to walk into a VC and say "I need a million dollars." And
they go "Hey unless you want five, don't waste our time because we have so
much money to invest and so little time to manage three, four, five, ten,
fifteen investments for our firm. We can't put it out in million-dollar
chunks, we have to put it out in much larger chunks."
Technology-Bank Emerging-Business Lender Interview, supra note 42 (transcript at 2).
120 One lender argued that venture capitalists currently have a shortage of intellectual
capacity to evaluate potential investments. Thus, they must ration their existing capacity
over fewer, larger investments than otherwise might be the case. See id. ("Dollars are not
the limiting factor. Intellectual capacity, mentoring is the limiting factor... .").
121 See Passela Interview, supra note 11 (transcript at 5-6) (discussing reasons why her
bank is reluctant to loan to technology-based development-stage "bootstrap" companies).
The other lender commented that
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tantly for the future, major players in the development-stage lending
market are enhancing funding opportunities for companies under-
served by the current venture-capital market. The most notable devel-
opment was the high-profile introduction in late 1998 of Garage.com,
a project expressly directed at pre-venture-capital enterprises. 22 Simi-
larly, another lender to whom I spoke explained that his institution
had identified a potential market niche created by the perception that
funds were unavailable to non-venture-backed companies. That insti-
tution is responding by implementing a program explicitly designed
to provide loans to development-stage companies that are too small to
obtain venture-capital backing. 123
In the end, it is not clear that the difficulty in obtaining funding
has any connection with the difficulty of liquidating software. The in-
formation I have found suggests that any difficulty is more a general
feature of the lending market-a natural consequence of the riskiness
of development-stage companies trying to generate profits based on
unproven technology. And however serious that difficulty might be,
the most important point for my purposes is clear: a substantial lend-
ing market provides funds for at least a significant subset of compa-
nies engaged in cutting-edge software development. That point
indicates that the symbiotic arrangements described in this Part gen-
erally have overcome the obstacle of software illiquidity. In terms of
the general thesis of this Article, the point indicates that the absence
of any effective liquidation remedy for the software-development
lender seems to have no significant effect on the availability of lending
for developing software. The loan transactions go forward profitably
despite the absence of a practicable method of liquidation.
[u]nless you are focused, unless you have a lot of horse power behind you
both in terms of management talent and in venture backing, you are not
going to get out of the starting gate. And if you are a bootstrap trying to
compete in that [market] space that is a deadman's strategy. And so, we
don't ignore the bootstraps, but they are not our primary focus for those
very reasons.
Trachy Interview, supra note 9 (transcript at 4).
122 See Roy Furchgott, Financier to the Garage Start-Up, N.Y. TiMEs, Oct. 18, 1998, § 3
(Magazine), at 2; Garage.com Debuts as New Technology Funding Source; PR NawswIE, Oct. 1,
1998, available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File; Karen Rodriguez, Garage.com Finds
Angels for Startups, Bus. J., Oct. 19, 1998, at 3, available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS
File; Technology-Bank Emerging-Business Lender Interview, supra note 42 (transcript at 2-
3). Substantial information on Garage.com is available on its website at (predictably
enough) <http://www.garage.com>.
123 See Technology-Bank Emerging-Business Lender Interview, supra note 42 (tran-
script at 4). Like the venture-backed lending described above, that lending would proceed
before the development of a revenue stream on the premise that objective indicators of a
likelihood of success (such as participation by particularly knowledgeable angel investors)
warrant belief that the borrower would survive at least until a venture capitalist could invest
and pay off the loan. See id. (transcript at 4-5, 7-11).
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Ill
SOFIWARE-AcQuISITION LENDING
Many companies invest substantially in software that they have
not developed. They might use software directly to produce revenue
(in the case of the Web-based information merchant), or, more con-
ventionally, they might use software simply to enhance the efficiency
with which they provide tangible goods or traditional services. In any
event, software is now a crucial asset for many businesses throughout
our economy. Thus, the question naturally arises (at least to the stu-
dent of commercial finance): Can a business borrow money to
purchase software when the software has little (or no) liquidation
value?
The answer is, "Absolutely." Indeed, the amount of that funding
is growing at a staggering pace. Although comprehensive statistics are
difficult to obtain, that type of financing certainly is in the range of
billions of dollars per year.124 The typical transaction would be in the
range of $100,000 to $200,000,125 but transactions could range from
as low as a few thousand dollars to as high as several million dollars.126
Typical applications might be to manage a nationwide database of
available hotel rooms and reservations, maintain a database of NAS-
DAQ stock quotations or the bank's account balance information, 127
124 See Telephone Interview with Anonymous Technology-Bank Software Lessor (Nov.
23 & Dec. 9, 1998) [hereinafter Technology-Bank Software-Lessor Interview] (transcript at
1-2, on file with author). One in-house counsel for a software developer told me that her
company alone sold more than $1 billion of financed software in 1997. See Telephone
Interview with Anonymous Software-Developer Counsel (Oct. 16, 1998) [hereinafter
Software-Developer Counsel Interview] (redacted notes of interview on file with author).
125 See Wetzel Interview, supra note 13 (transcript at 1) (reporting an average size be-
tween $250,000 and $500,000, with some multimillion-dollar deals); see also LPI Software
Funding Group, Inc., Background (last modifiedJune 2, 1999) <http://w~v.lpilease.com/
backmsb.htm> [hereinafter LPI Software Home Page] ("We... prefer the minimum lease
size to be $25,000, although there are exceptions to this limit."); Telephone Interview with
Jack Ciulla, President, Advantage Software Funding Group (Dec. 11, 1998) [hereinafter
Ciulla Interview] (transcript at 2, on file with author) (reporting a typical size of "about
$100,000 to $200,000"); Bazrod Interview, supra note 9 (transcript at 3) (statement of
software lessor) (noting that his company's "average deal varies between $150 to $200
thousand, but the range has been from $4,000 to $10 million"); Software-Developer Coun-
sel Interview, supra note 124 (notes at 2) (describing 1100 transactions totaling more than
$1 billion). One banker told me that in his market the average size of the transaction
appears to be rising fairly rapidly so that, at least for his institution, it is now up into the
$350,000 to $500,000 range. See Technology-Bank Software-Lessor Interview, supra note
124 (transcript at 2-4).
126 See LPI Software Home Page, supra note 125 ("In the last five years, our smallest
transaction has been for $4,000; our largest $10,000,000.").
127 See Software-Developer Counsel Interview, supra note 124 (notes at 2) (describing
some of the software applications financed by those transactions).
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or provide a uniform desktop operating system for all of the worksta-
tions in a large company.128
A. The Private Ordering of the Transaction
1. The Structure of the Loan
Because the field has developed so rapidly and so recently, the
transactions currently appear in a dizzying variety of formats. The de-
fining characteristic of the transactions relevant to this discussion is
that a software vendor (a licensor) sells a large-dollar software system
to an end-user (a licensee) that uses the software in its business.12 9
The transaction is facilitated by a lender's intervention to provide the
funds for the purchase at the time of the acquisition. Ordinarily,
though not always, the licensor brings the lender to the transaction on
the basis of a preexisting relation with the lender. 30 The lender typi-
cally advances funds to the licensor in a lump sum sufficient to defray
128 See McAuley Interview, supra note 10 (transcript at 4) (describing transactions
under Microsoft's Open License program and the increasing interest in using financing to
allow the immediate purchase of software by the end-user).
129 It is conventional in the software industry to describe that transaction as a license
rather than a sale, because the licensor grants only a right to use the software. The licensor
does not transfer whatever copyright, patent, or trade-secret rights it might have in the
software.
130 Numerous software lenders confirmed the prevalence of that arrangement. See
Software-Developer Counsel Interview, supra note 124 (notes at 1-2) (describing the use of
financiers affiliated with the software developer); Technology-Bank Software-Lessor Inter-
view, supra note 124 (transcript at 5-6) (discussing the shift in the industry from licensee-
based working-capital financing to vendor-finance programs); Halverson Interview, supra
note 11 (transcript at 2) ("[Iff you wanted to be in that business you needed to be aligned
with the software vendors."); Wetzel Interview, supra note 13 (transcript at 3) ("[T]he ma-
jority of the business we originate comes from our vendor programs."); Passela Interview,
supra note 11 (transcript at 7-8) (describing a bank's vendor-financing programs); Tele-
phone Interview with Greg Seketa, Chief Counsel, Technology Finance, Newcourt Finan-
cial USA, Inc. (July 21, 1999) [hereinafter Seketa Interview] (transcript at 3, on file with
author) (describing the "predominan[t] focu[s] . . . [on] relationships with licensors");
Hayden Interview, supra note 9 (transcript at 2) (describing a typical vendor financing
program); Ciulla Interview, supra note 125 (transcript at 2-3) (explaining that his transac-
tions usually are based on vendor relationships); Bazrod Interview, supra note 9 (transcript
at 6-7) (describing the development of relationships between a large software lessor and
vendors); Trachy Interview, supra note 9 (transcript at 9-10) ("[T]here are not banks who
just go around the country specializing in financing the purchase of software applications.
Generally what occurs is that [the lenders enter into vendor financing arrangements based
on exclusive deal flow to the identified lender]."); see also Advantage Software Funding
Group, Frequently Asked Questions (visited Sept. 3, 1999) <http://wvw.advantage-sfg.com/
faq.html> [hereinafter Advantage Software FAQ (advertisement by software financier) (an-
swering questions frequently asked by software vendors); First Sierra Software Finance,
How It Works (visited Sept. 3, 1999) <http://wwv.softwarefinance.com/how.html> (provid-
ing a pictorial representation of lender's facilitation of transactions with software users
based on relationship between lender and software vendor); LPI Software Home Page,
supra note 125 (advertising its vision to become "the best software leasing company" and
emphasizing the financier's "formal or informal relationships with more than 60 software
vendors").
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the entire cost of the software. The licensee, in turn, undertakes to
repay the lender over time.1 ' Although variation is considerable, the
typical payment schedule amortizes the debt over a period of three to
five years.'8 2 The interest rates vary considerably with the credit of the
end-user, but they seem to be surprisingly modest.88
For reasons that seem to be largely historical, that type of financ-
ing generally is referred to as software leasing,18 4 by analogy to the
market for equipment leasing.135 The markets bear obvious similari-
ties: Both involve lenders accommodating the acquisition by business
enterprises of specific, relatively fungible large-dollar assets that gen-
erate sufficient revenues to support a stream of payments amortizing
181 See Software-Developer Counsel Interview, supra note 124 (notes at 1-2) (describing
the structure of a transaction using an affiliated financier).
132 See Software-Developer Counsel Interview, supra note 124 (notes at 1) ("The dura-
tion is two to three years."); Wetzel Interview, supra note 13 (transcript at 1) ("[F]ive years
is the majority of the longest terms, although we did do one 7-year transaction."); Passela
Interview, supra note 11 (transcript at 8) ("Usually the leases would not be more than 24 to
36 months."); Hayden Interview, supra note 9 (transcript at 3) (describing a three-year
term as average and five years as the longest typical term); Ciulla Interview, supra note 125
(transcript at 3) (suggesting that three to five years is typical); Bazrod Interview, supra note
9 (transcript at 4-5) (noting that the transactions "tend to be 2- to 3-year leases... but on
some of the... larger transactions-... say a 1/4 of a million dollars and more-there is a
... tendency to go toward 5 years"); see also Advantage Software FAQ, supra note 130 ("Stan-
dard terms are from 1 to 5 years, with level payments paid monthly or quarterly.").
13 The rates that were quoted to me varied widely, but none of them were high. See
Hayden Interview, supra note 9 (transcript at 10) (suggesting that a typical mid-sized pri-
vately held company in a $50,000 transaction would pay about 12.5% to 13% under market
conditions at the time of the interview); Ciulla Interview, supra note 125 (transcript at 3-4)
(suggesting that a typical company would pay an interest rate of 10.5% to 12% per annum
under market conditions).
134 See Bazrod Interview, supra note 9 (transcript at 11) (agreeing that references to
leasing are common in part because "[t]he user is used to seeing [equipment leasing trans-
actions"). Mr. Bazrod also suggested that accounting rules encourage leasing. See id. (tran-
script at 11-12). In his view, it is "simpler to expense the payments when you have a lease
than when you have a loan agreement. ... For the large companies that is a big impetus
for leasing software .... " Id. A related problem makes it difficult for vendors to report
income from sales if they permit deferred payment of the purchase price: under current
accounting rules it ordinarily is improper to treat a transaction as a sale if any portion of
the payments due to the seller is deferred for more than a year. See AcCOUNTING STAN-
DARDS ExEcUTIrvE CoMM., AMERICAN INsT. OF CERTIFIED PUB. AccouNTANTS, STATEMENT OF
PosMoN 97-2: SomTARE REVENUE REcOGNITION 20 (1997) [hereinafter AICPA SOP 97-2]
(articulating a presumption against treating a payment as fixed and determinable if "pay-
ment of a significant portion of the software licensing fee is not due until.., more than
twelve months after delivery"). The natural solution to the problem, of course, is for the
user to make deferred payments to a third party (the lender), who in turn makes immedi-
ate full payment to the vendor. Under that arrangement, the vendor can realize immedi-
ate income from the sale, while the user can extend the timing of its payments to match
more closely the timing of the revenue accruing from the use of the software.
135 See Passela Interview, supra note 11 (transcript at 7) (statement of banker) (describ-
ing how her bank leases software); Bazrod Interview, supra note 9 (transcript at 9-10) (ex-
plaining the use of the term "lease" in the software-acquisition financing industry); Gulste
Interview, supra note 11 (transcript at 4) (discussing the vagueness of the term "leasing" in
software finance transactions).
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the cost of the assets over a period of years. Also, several of the earli-
est prominent lenders in the software-leasing industry have (or had)
large equipment leasing programs. 136
But whatever the reason for the software-leasing label, the trans-
action at issue here is so different from the equipment-leasing transac-
tion that use of that label fosters considerable confusion.13 7 More
importantly, in equipment leasing the lessor acquires tide to the asset,
at least momentarily, and then leases the asset to the borrower/end-
user.l38 In the context of software, however, that arrangement is rela-
tively uncommon. To be sure, it is possible to structure a transaction
that inserts the lender between the licensor and the end-user licensee.
The arrangement would involve the following two separate licenses:
the first from the primary licensor to the lender (as first-tier licensee)
and the second a sublicense from the lender (as sublicensor) to the
end-user (as sublicensee),139 In the early years of the industry, the
familiarity of equipment leasing seems to have motivated use of that
arrangement. It appears, however, that in recent years "financiers
have moved away from being in the middle of the license chain, which
gives rise to potential liabilities for copyright, performance and other
issues."140
136 That seems to be the case with Comdisco and GE Capital, both of whom have large
equipment-leasing programs and are reputed to have large software-leasing programs. See
Trachy Interview, supra note 9 (transcript at 9-11) (suggesting that GE Capital does
software leasing in "a fairly extensive way" and that "Comdisco is very active on the leasing
side"). The link with equipment leasing also is clear with respect to several of my interview
subjects. For example, LPI Software Funding Group explains on its home page:
LPI and its management has [sic] concentrated in the computer and
communications industries since the late 1960's. After leasing more than
$1.5 billion of computer and communication equipment, primarily by
short-term operating leases, in the United States, Canada and Europe, we
concluded in late 1991 that the paradigm of the computer industry had
experienced a monumental shift-the value of hardware was declining at
an accelerating rate and the primary value generator in the industry was
now software. So LPI changed its focus from equipment and now concen-
trates on leasing computer software ....
LPI Software Home Page, supra note 125 (emphasis omitted); see also Hayden Interview,
supra note 9 (transcript at 1) (describing evolution of his company from equipment leasing
to software leasing); Ciulla Interview, supra note 125 (transcript at 4) (same).
137 See Halverson Interview, supra note 11 (transcript at 2) (statement of equipment
lessor) (noting that the software end-users are not exactly "lessees," but "in this case really
borrowers because [they] don't have title to the asset").
138 See generally DANIEL KEATNG, SALEs: A SYsTEMs APPROACH 156-61, 270-72 (1998)
(presenting an introductory discussion of UCC provisions regarding finance leases).
139 See Veatch, supra note 68, 1 31A.07[2] [b], at 31A-14 to 31A-15 (describing that
transaction); Memorandum from Steven 0. Weise, Heller Ehrman White & McAuliffe, to
Article 9 Drafting Committee and Interested Persons 3 (Jan. 12, 1998) (copy on file with
author) [hereinafter Weise Memorandum] (reviewing Article 9 issues affecting software
financing structures).
140 Memorandum from Anil Vora, Vice President, Oracle Financing Division, to Pro-"
fessor Raymond T. Nimmer, Reporter for Article 2B, and Carlyle C. Ring, Jr., Chairman,
Drafting Committee 1 (Feb. 14, 1997) (copy on file with author) [hereinafter Vora Febru-
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A more functional distinction between equipment leasing and
software-acquisition transactions arises from the different useful lives
of equipment and software. At least in some contexts, equipment has
a significant useful life beyond the term of the lease.141 Thus, the
parties often contemplate a return of the equipment to the lessor at
the conclusion of the lease, followed by a second re-leasing of the
equipment to a subsequent user.142 For the reasons discussed above,
that result is most unlikely in the software context.' 43
One interesting question about software-acquisition transactions
is why the long-term lending relationships generally run with the
software developers rather than the end-users. All the parties with
whom I discussed this type of lending emphasized the dominance of
transactions in which the lender established a regular program with a
software vendor financing the acquisition of the client's software by
end-users. 4 4 The most obvious answer is historical. You could say
that equipment financiers traditionally have operated based on rela-
tions with the equipment manufacturers and that software-acquisition
ary 1997 Memorandum]; seeWilliam S. Veatch, Software Leasing. The Intricacies of the Intangi-
b14J. EQUIPMENT LEASE FINANCING, Fall 1996, at 21, 24 (explaining that in the software loan
transaction the software typically passes directly from the licensor to the user, without go-
ing through the lender); Passela Interview, supra note 11 (transcript at 7) (statement of
bank officer who finances software purchases) ("I don't know of any circumstance where
... [vendors] have licensed us and we have sublicensed it."); Ciulla Interview, supra note
125 (transcript at 6) ("[W]e have nothing to do with the license between the vendor and
the end user.... ."); Bazrod Interview, supra note 9 (transcript at 9) (statement of software
lessor) (indicating that he prefers a structure in which the software goes directly from the
licensor to the end-user because "[w] e don't have to worry about warranties and liabilities
if the software doesn't work like we would if it was a license/sublicense agreement").
141 Indeed, a transaction would not qualify as a lease under U.C.C. § 1-201(37) if there
was no realistic likelihood that the lessor would regain the property at the termination of
the lease. See, e.g., 4 WHiTE & SUMMERS, supra note 38, § 30-3 (discussing the UCC's distinc-
tion between leases and security interests); see also Bazrod Interview, supra note 9 (tran-
script at 9) (defending use of the term "lease" to refer to software financing on the ground
that Article 9 recognizes leases that are functionally equivalent to secured transactions).
142 See Halverson Interview, supra note 11 (transcript at 1) (stating that equipment
lessors "ultimately expect to take [the equipment] back and remarket it and earn some
kind of residual value"); Wetzel Interview, supra note 13 (transcript at 4) (contrasting the
ready ability of equipment lessors to remarket their typical "yellow iron" products-trac-
tors-with the difficulties they would face in remarketing software); Bazrod Interview,
supra note 9 (transcript at 1) (recalling that lenders in equipment leasing transactions
often "got [the collateral] back and liquidat[ed it]").
143 See Halverson Interview, supra note 11 (transcript at 1-2) (statement by officer of
large equipment lessor) (suggesting that the traditional business model for the equipment
lessor does not work in the software context because of the limited residual value of
software); Bazrod Interview, supra note 9 (transcript at 11) ("[I]n almost all cases in the
equipment-leasing business you can sell that asset to somebody else and in most cases in
software you can't sell it."); Guiste Interview, supra note 11 (transcript at 4) (suggesting
that the residual value of software is so low that it makes little sense to characterize
software-lending transactions as leases instead of fully amortizing purchase-money loans);
see also supra Part IA1 (discussing the short half-life of software liquidation value).
144 See sources cited supra note 130.
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financing has developed in the same mold. But absent some func-
tional or cost-based rationale for the arrangement, that answer seems
a bit too easy. The sophistication of the players and the amount of
money involved suggest that there is some rational basis for the pre-
vailing pattern. 145 Although it is difficult to produce a definitive ex-
planation, a number of possible reasons support the current
arrangement.
The most plausible explanation relates to economies of scale in
transaction design. Those economies cut distinctly in favor of a licen-
sor-lender structure and against a licensee-lender structure. In the li-
censor-lender structure that characterizes much of the current
industry, the licensor recommends the lender to a large share of the
licensor's customers. Thus, the lender frequently engages in transac-
tions that finance the same or similar software. Hence, the lender
develops an understanding of the amount of revenue that a particular
software product is likely to generate and the period of time over
which those revenues are likely to be sustained. 46 The cost of devel-
oping that understanding is minimized because of the large volume of
transactions over which it can be allocated.
Conversely, the downside of the licensor-lender structure is that
the lender must begin each transaction with an assessment of the
creditworthiness of the end-user that is acquiring the software. In a
licensee-lender structure, the lender would acquire a detailed under-
standing of a particular borrower's creditworthiness, on which the
lender could rely when funding any of the borrower's software acquisi-
tions. Although generalizations are risky, under current technology
the greater benefit usually should come from reductions in the costs
of assessing the software. Software is a rapidly developing, heteroge-
nous asset unlikely to be susceptible to simple categorization. By con-
trast, lenders have developed relatively routinized and streamlined
procedures for assessing and categorizing the creditworthiness of
businesses.147
A closely related benefit comes from the capacity of the licensor-
lender structure to generate a large number of obligations to pay over
time for the same software. Because those obligations are relatively
145 Moreover, although the explanations I provide here are relatively localized to the
software industry, it is worth noting (as Steve Harris has pointed out to me) that the seller-
financier structure appears in many other lending industries-most notably the automo-
bile-retail industry. Thus, the benefits of that arrangement seem to appear in many
contexts.
146 See infra note 176 and accompanying text (discussing the importance of careful
assessment of the vendors to whom a software lender provides financing).
147 Public credit ratings for large creditworthy businesses are likely to be available from
a glance at a newspaper. For small businesses, credit scoring offers an inexpensive, rapid,
and accurate method of assessment. See, e.g., Mann, Small-Business Secured Credi, supra note
5, at 30-34 (discussing the use of credit scoring in small-business lending).
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homogenous, 148 the lender can securitize those obligations and thus
transfer them into the public debt markets.1 49 Although those trans-
actions are just beginning to occur, 150 the possibility of general access
to those markets presents a significant long-term benefit of the ex-
isting licensor-lender structure.
In two respects, relational concerns also appear to favor the licen-
sor-lender structure. Admittedly, that structure forfeits the benefits of
traditional relational lending with the end-user.15' In this context,
however, crucial benefits accrue to the lender from formal relations
with the licensor. At a basic level, for example, the relationship with
the licensor substantially limits the likelihood that the lender will be
tricked into financing fraudulent transactions between a licensor and
licensee. 52 Also, the lender can enhance its loan transactions
through its relation with the software developer; for example, the
148 It is easy to overstate the benefits of homogeneity. One software financier reports
that the "buckets" of software obligations he sells are "highly heterogenous" so as to elimi-
nate particular risks related to "the vendor that supplied the software, .. . regionality [and
the] industry of the customer." Wetzel Interview, supra note 13 (transcript at 2). That
comment makes considerable sense, only because the person originating the loans is likely
'to do a much more informed job of diversifying the securities that go into the pool. Still, it
is not clear to me why that job could not be done at some later stage of the investment
cycle. Investors should be indifferent between an investment in a diversified pool of one
financier's obligations and investments in several homogenous pools generated by several
different software financiers.
149 I have not received consistent information about the frequency of those transac-
tions. See Software-Developer Counsel Interview, supra note 124 (notes at 1) (describing
that transaction as governing "most ... but not all" of the financed software that her
company sells); Seketa Interview, supra note 130 (transcript at 4-6) (describing routine
securitization of software financing transactions); Hayden Interview, supra note 9 (tran-
script at 5) (statement of soffwvare lessor) ("We securitize virtually all of our software trans-
actions."). But see Supplemental Telephone Interview with Anonymous Technology-Bank
Software Lessor (Dec. 16, 1998) [hereinafter Supplemental Technology-Bank Software-Les-
sor Interview] (transcript at 1, on file with author) (statement of bank officer specializing
in software leasing) ("[T]here has been a little drying up of [software securitization] and I
would say... that people are not doing securitization as often as they did say a year ago or
two years ago."); Wetzel Interview, supra note 13 (transcript at 1) (stating that only two
small securitizations had been completed to date, both of which were limited to invest-
ment-grade end-users, and characterizing the "software financing, securitization market-
place as dead or not accessible or not available"). A functionally similar transaction that
seems common entails a software company financing a group of similar transactions and
then selling them off "at very low margins" to banks or other financial institutions. Bazrod
Interview, supra note 9 (transcript at 4); seeWetzel Interview, supra note 13 (transcript at 2)
(describing "buckets of those deals, in $5, $10, $15 million dollar buckets [that he] sell[s]
... to insurance companies, major finance companies, major banks").
150 See Bazrod Interview, supra note 9 (transcript at 13) (suggesting that the first such
transactions were completed in 1998, based on installment-payment obligations collected
by single software licensors).
151 See, e.g., Mann, Verification Institutions, supra note 5, at 2249-52 (discussing the bene-
fits of traditional relational lending). It appears that the lenders do not have multifaceted
relationships with the software developers that would provide relational benefits extending
beyond the software-lending program.
152 See Seketa Interview, supra note 130 (transcript at 13-14).
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lender can obtain the consent to a transfer or termination of the li-
censee's interest in the software that guarantees an effective remedy
for the lender in the case of default.1 5 3 An even better arrangement
would allow the lender to obtain a commitment by the licensor to take
some affirmative action to support the lender's action; for instance,
the software developer could agree to cease its support and mainte-
nance of any license terminated by the lender. 5 4 Interestingly, what
the lender fails to obtain, even in long-term vendor arrangements, is
permission from the software developer to remarket software for
which borrowers are unable to pay.155
Another benefit that the lender obtains from the licensor-lender
structure is the valuable free marketing it receives from the software
vendor. 56 A long-term relationship with a software vendor can en-
sure that the lender's products are offered directly to each of the ven-
dor's customers. As one lender put it, "by hooking up with a [large
153 See McAuley Interview, supra note 10 (transcript at 8) (statement of Microsoft exec-
utive) (describing financiers' efforts to obtain confirmation of Microsoft's willingness to
cooperate with enforcement of their remedies upon default); Supplemental Technology-
Bank Software-Lessor Interview, supra note 149 (transcript at 6-7) (describing provisions in
a vendor-finance agreement permitting termination of a license upon the user's failure to
pay); Wetzel Interview, supra note 13 (transcript at 4-5) (emphasizing the importance of
obtaining the vendor's consent to termination of the software license by the software finan-
cier); Hayden Interview, supra note 9 (transcript at 3-4) (describing vendor agreements
that obligate the vendor to terminate support and terminate the user's license upon failure
to pay the lender); Seketa Interview, supra note 130 (transcript at 3) (describing the ven-
dor agreements in which the licensor agrees to "terminate support and service" and also
.preclude the licensor from re-licensing [to the defaulting end-user] for a period of
time"). For a discussion of the legal obstacles to such financing in the absence of licensor
consent, see supra Part I.B.4.
154 See Supplemental Technology-Bank Software-Lessor Interview, supra note 149 (tran-
script at 6-7) (discussing the practical significance of the licensor's willingness to terminate
support).
155 See Bazrod Interview, supra note 9 (transcript at 7-8) (discussing efforts to obtain
remarketing agreements and accounting obstacles that make licensors increasingly unwill-
ing to provide them). Those agreements are loosely analogous to the repurchase agree-
ments that traditional finance companies use when they finance equipment purchases. See
Mann, supra note 75, at 167-68 (discussing repurchase agreements). For software, how-
ever, the software developer's willingness to accept a direct repurchase obligation is rather
limited because of the likelihood that such an obligation will prevent accounting treatment
of the transaction as a final sale. SeeAICPA SOP 97-2, supra note 134, at 48 (noting that the
"likelihood of vendor refunds" weighs against treating the payment as sufficiently fixed or
determinable to justify treating the transaction as a sale); Hayden Interview, supra note 9
(transcript at 4) (discussing that accounting problem under SOP 97-2); Software-Devel-
oper Counsel Interview, supra note 124 (notes at 2) (same); see also Passela Interview, supra
note 11 (transcript at 9) (describing the efforts of software lenders to obtain recourse to
the licensor in the event of default by the end-user borrower); Trachy Interview, supra note
9 (transcript at 10) (same).
156 See Wetzel Interview, supra note 13 (transcript at 3) (attributing the prevalence of
vendor-based financing to the fact that "the vendors are introducing us to the end users");
Hayden Interview, supra note 9 (transcript at 6) (explaining that "the main thing that we
look for in a vendor.., is a proactive use of the program and a commitment for them to
actively roll it out").
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software company] I have effectively got 1,000 people out in the field
working handing out pieces of paper with my name on it and saying
... if you want... software and you want to finance call [the interview
subject] and he can arrange it."1 57
One final possible explanation for the apparent preference for
the licensor-lender structure is that the industry might be less homog-
enous than it appears.158 Lenders make loans to large creditworthy
companies to purchase software based on the overall financial
strength of each company, with little regard for the nature or quality
of the company's specific assets.159 Because the largest creditworthy
companies probably hold a significant share of the market for large-
dollar software purchases, lenders to those companies might finance a
large portion of software acquisitions. Yet because the loans are not
asset based in any significant way, those lenders would not appear as
members of the software-lending industry.160
2. Termination as the Remedy
The central question in all lending arrangements is what protec-
tion the lender obtains to ensure repayment of its loan. As a formal
matter, the answer to that question depends on the structure of the
transaction. For example, if the transaction is an assignment to the
lender of a periodic payment stream due to the licensor from the li-
censee, the lender's collateral is an "account" under the new Article
9.161 Alternatively, if the transaction is structured as an advance of
funds to the borrower that the borrower uses to purchase the software
157 Ciulla Interview, supra note 125 (transcript at 2-3).
158 My research suggests only that most of the lending proceeds on the licensor-lender
model, but not all of it. It is clear from several of my interviews that some licensee-lender
transactions occur. See Kielb Interview, supra note 73 (describing software lenders who
fund software purchases only by venture-backed borrowers); Technology-Bank Software-
Lessor Interview, supra note 124 (transcript at 3-5) (describing bank financing directed at
the acquisition of software by venture-capital-backed companies); Hayden Interview, supra
note 9 (transcript at 4-5) (describing occasional licensee-lender transactions); Ciulla Inter-
view, supra note 125 (transcript at 7) ("[T]hey come to us[;] we don't spend our marketing
time and dollars looking for them .... ."); Bazrod Interview, supra note 9 (transcript at 6-7,
12-13) (describing licensee-lender transactions).
159 See Mann, supra note 3, at 668-74 (discussing the use of unsecured debt by
creditworthy borrowers); see also id. at 677 & n.208 (discussing the limited ability of even
the strongest technology companies to obtain long-term unsecured debt).
160 See Passela Interview, supra note 11 (transcript at 7) (describing "the lessee as being
the source of repayment" and noting, "[S]o a lot of our decision on what we would be
willing to do would have to do with the financial strength of that particular entity rather
than as to what we believe the value of the license was"); Bazrod Interview, supra note 9
(transcript at 4) ("If you leased a million dollars of software to J.P. Morgan you wouldn't
care if it was software, hardware, pencils or whatever."); Trachy Interview, supra note 9
(transcript at 9-10) (describing how licensees obtain financing from their existing bank
lenders).
161 See U.C.G. § 9-102 (a) (2) (i) (extending the definition of "account" in the old
U.G.C. § 9-106 to include not only payments for goods and services, but also "a right to
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from the licensor, the stream of payments from the borrower to the
originating lender might be transferred to a third-party lender as a
"payment intangible." 162
In either case, however, the payment stream (i.e., the obligation
of the end-user to repay the loan) is the principal source of repay-
ment.163 To be sure, it is certainly possible for the lender to take a
security interest in the licensee's interest in the license, with a view to
foreclosing on the software and to remarketing it in the event of de-
fault by the licensee/end-user/borrower. 6 4 But the feasibility of that
lending runs squarely into the difficulties identified in Part I, most
importantly the legal prohibition on foreclosure without the consent
of the licensor. 16 5 If anything is clear about this industry, it is that
licensors usually are unwilling to permit foreclosure and transfer of
software from the original user to the lender or any third party.166
payment of a monetary obligation... for property that has been.., licensed"); Veatch,
supra note 68, 1 31A.07[3], at 31A-16 (describing that transaction).
162 See U.C.G. § 9-102(a) (61) (defining payment intangible). Those transactions ap-
pear to be the basis for sales of software-financing arrangements into the secondary finan-
cial markets. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
163 See Trachy Interview, supra note 9 (transcript at 8) (explaining that "people in our
business who lend money to technology companies really don't like the prospects of hav-
ing to liquidate these kinds of assets" and explaining that "[i]t's cash flow that repays bank
debt, pure and simple, cash flow").
164 See, e.g., Passela Interview, supra note 11 (transcript at 7-8) (describing secured
software financing by banks); Bazrod Interview, supra note 9 (transcript at 10-11) (describ-
ing such transactions with respect to Microsoft Office software); Trachy Interview, supra
note 9 (transcript at 8) (recognizing the possibility of such lending).
165 See supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text. That problem does not arise for the
software-development lender, because it funds the licensor that owns the software rather
than the licensee.
166 See Supplemental Telephone Interview with Anonymous Software-Developer Coun-
sel (Mar. 5, 1998) (redacted notes at 1, on file with author) (describing her company's
unwillingness to permit transfers of the licensee's interest to the software lender); Supple-
mental Technology-Bank Software-Lessor Interview, supra note 149 (transcript at 8-9)
(statement of bank officer specializing in software leasing) (stating that his institution does
not even ask vendors for a right to remarket software); Halverson Interview, supra note 11
(transcript at 1) (explaining that the licensors typically want "another license fee if [the
software] moves at the end of term"); Wetzel Interview, supra note 13 (transcript at 3-4)
(suggesting that it "has yet to happen" that a licensor will grant his company a right to
remarket and commenting that "[w]e used to ask" for permission to remarket, but no
longer do so); Bazrod Interview, supra note 9 (transcript at 10) (agreeing with the state-
ment that his company has a lot of leases with no right to remarket); Guiste Interview,
supra note 11 (transcript at 6-7) (statement of Microsoft executive) ("Our biggest concern
... is the redistribution of those licenses.... If the customer defaults the leasing company
can shut off the licenses, but they cannot redistribute those licenses to anybody else.").
That is not always true. Microsoft, for example, permits such transfers under its Open
License arrangement, but only if the software is sold en masse. See McAuley Interview,
supra note 10 (transcript at 4-5). The requirement that the software be sold en masse
ensures that the purchaser is using enough copies of the software to be entitled to the
price charged the original user. That strategy prevents the lender from breaking up the
software into smaller parcels and consequently undercutting Microsoft's size-based, tiered
pricing scheme. See id.
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Lenders respond to that situation in various ways. Some lenders
still take security interests in the software of the borrowers to which
they lend.167 Those lenders recognize that in some sense security in-
terests are futile, because (at least in most cases) those interests do not
provide the lenders any right to use or liquidate the software. 168
Thus, many lenders entirely abandon the pretense of requiring collat-
eral. In that arrangement, known in the industry as unsecured
software leasing, the lender's rights against the licensee include
neither a security interest nor any right to resell or remarket the
software; instead, the lender's remedy is limited to a simple right to
terminate the licensee's use of the software.169
167 See Supplemental Technology-Bank Software-Lessor Interview, supra note 149 (tran-
script at 7-8) (acknowledging that "some people in the business world... think you really
should [file UCCs and perfect a security interest]" even though he does not); Wetzel Inter-
view, supra note 13 (transcript at 3) (describing the practice of filing UCC financing state-
ments); Passela Interview, supra note 11 (transcript at 7-8); Hayden Interview, supra note 9
(transcript at 6) (stating that he takes a security interest in larger transactions); Ciulla
Interview, supra note 125 (transcript at 4-5) (noting that he formally takes a security inter-
est); Bazrod Interview, supra note 9 (transcript at 14) (explaining that he structures all his
transactions as secured transactions, even though he often has no right to remarket the
software); Trachy Interview, supra note 9 (transcript at 8) (describing insistence on a secur-
ity interest as bankers' "fallback position").
168 See Wetzel Interview, supra note 13 (transcript at 3) (characterizing UCC filings as
'useless" and "more form over substance"); Hayden Interview, supra note 9 (transcript at 7)
("[W]e do not have th[e] illusion [that we can resell the software]."); Ciulla Interview,
supra note 125 (transcript at 5) (acknowledging that he has no right to resell the software);
Bazrod Interview, supr-a note 9 (transcript at 15) (statement of financier) (acknowledging
that he could not resell the collateral); Trachy Interview, supra note 9, at 8 (suggesting that
.at the end of the day it doesn't really matter" whether the transaction is secured or not).
169 See McAuley Interview, supra note 10 (transcript at 9-11) (describing those arrange-
ments with respect to Microsoft software); Supplemental Technology-Bank Software-Lessor
Interview, supra note 149 (transcript at 7-8) (statement of bank officer specializing in
software leasing) (stating that his bank treats software leasing as unsecured lending, with-
out financing statements); Software-Developer Counsel Interview, supra note 124 (notes at
1-2) (describing that arrangement); Seketa Interview, supra note 130 (transcript at 2-3)
(statement of software financier) (agreeing that "we don't [file financing statements] ...
[because] the only thing we're interested in is the right ... to shut off the license"); Bazrod
Interview, supra note 9 (transcript at 7) (statement of software lessor) (noting that even if
he asks for a right to remarket, "you don't get it very often [because] ... most of the time
the vendors don't give that up"); Guiste Interview, supra note 11 (transcript at 2-3) (indi-
cating that Microsoft licensees that use financing do not grant security interests to their
lenders, but instead rely on the right to terminate use); see also Veatch, supra note 140, at
27 (statement of experienced practitioner) (contending that "many software lease transac-
tions are documented as unsecured transactions"); Memorandum from Anil Vora, Vice
President, Oracle Financing Division, to Professor Raymond T. Nimmer, Reporter for Arti-
cle 2B, and Carlyle C. Ring, Jr., Chairman, Drafting Committee 1 (Mar. 31, 1997) (copy on
file with author) [hereinafter Vora March 1997 Memorandum] (describing secured and
unsecured structures and asserting that the unsecured structure is "a major segment of the
pure software financing transactions" and that "[w] e have financed the acquisition of over
$1 billion of licenses and related services using this structure"); Weise Memorandum, supra
note 139, at 3-4 (describing unsecured software financing by licensees). For a typical ter-
mination clause, see Veatch, supra note 68, at 31A-89 (Form 31A-10, at 1 5).
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At first glance, the absence of repossession and liquidation rights
appears to make that remedy starkly inferior to the classic remedies of
secured creditors. Closer examination, however, reveals several vir-
tues: First, simple termination of use generally has lower transaction
costs than repossession and sale, if only because the termination rem-
edy saves the costs of repossession and sale. Second, for the reasons
discussed in Part I-principally the low probability that liquidation
would produce significant revenues-losing the right to liquidate
software is not all that significant.170
Finally and certainly most importantly as a matter of transactional
design, termination of use, in practice, is likely to be the most effective
remedy for the lenders.171 Given the likely importance of a large-dol-
lar software system to its typical user, a right to terminate use of that
software gives the lender considerable leverage over the borrower. In
many cases, that leverage might force the borrower to pay the debt,
even if the lender has no right to repossess and remarket the
software. 172 As one software lessor put it:
It's the real remedy. It is the only real remedy and it is a very
worthwhile one. I think it is a better remedy than trying to get the
software and remarket it because in most cases the software is essen-
tial to running the business. Even something mundane like word-
processing-you can't run your business, I think, without word-
processing software. 173
170 See Bazrod Interview, supra note 9 (transcript at 15) (stating that he has no diffi-
culty with the lack of a remarketing right "[b] ecause we are really not looking at the value
of collateral being derived from the proceeds on remarketing"); Trachy Interview, supra
note 9 (transcript at 8) (suggesting that "at the end of the day it doesn't really matter"
whether the transaction is secured or unsecured).
171 It is difficult to obtain comprehensive statistics about default; most of my interview
subjects considered that information confidential. The two software financiers that offered
loss rates both indicated that less than 2% of their transactions default during the course of
repayment. See Wetzel Interview, supra note 13 (transcript at 2) (reporting a loss rate of
1.7%); Hayden Interview, supra note 9 (transcript at 9) (reporting a loss rate of 1.6%).
172 That assumes, of course, that the lender's threat to use the remedy can be made
credible to the borrower. Because the industry is young and still developing, it is not yet
clear whether lenders frequently will use the remedy. As the interviews below suggest, the
remedy presently appears to be sufficiently credible to be effective. For a more general
theoretical discussion of the credibility problem, see Mann, Verification Institutions, supra
note 5, at 2237-39.
173 Bazrod Interview, supra note 9 (transcript at 8); see Software-Developer Counsel
Interview, supra note 124 (notes at 2) (suggesting that experience with exercising the ter-
mination right with regard to the use of her company's software is limited, or perhaps
nonexistent, because the software is too "crucial" for end-users to risk termination); McAu-
ley Interview, supra note 10 (transcript at 14) ("[S]omething as simple as [recognizing the
lender's right to terminate] would give the teeth necessary to have a very successful li-
censed finance program."); Wetzel Interview, supra note 13 (transcript at 4) (explaining
that the right to terminate provides "negative leverage-there is no collateral from a
remarketing standpoint, but there is collateral from a negative leverage standpoint").
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Of course, the effectiveness of termination as a remedy does not
mean that default is impossible. Defaults do, however, tend to be clus-
tered in one of two situations: The first is the situation in which the
software does not perform up to the user's expectations. 174 When the
user does not want the software, the threat of termination obviously is
somewhat hollow.175 Responding to that concern, sophisticated
software lessors try to focus their vendor programs on vendors with
two particular characteristics: (1) vendors whose software solves a
"mission critical" problem and (2) vendors with a reputation for pro-
viding first-rate solutions to their customers.' 76 The second situation
in which defaults are common occurs when the user's business has
failed entirely. If the user has closed its doors and is no longer operat-
ing, turning off the software cannot harm the user.177
To be sure, self-help (and electronic self-help in particular)178 af-
fords the lender a considerable opportunity for destructive opportu-
nistic behavior. Moreover, termination of an important software
system could cause a serious harm to third parties-particularly to the
customers of the borrower. Those concerns undermine the net value
174 A related problem-which does not seem to have arisen substantially to date-
would arise if the licensor becomes insolvent. Because the quality of maintenance and up-
grades would be likely to deteriorate with the insolvency of the licensor, the incidence of
defaults should rise at that time.
175 See Ciulla Interview, supra note 125 (transcript at 10-11) (describing a default in
such a situation). To protect against that problem, software financiers typically obtain the
right to pursue the licensor for breach of any representations or warranties in the license.
See William S. Veatch, Software Financing: The Perplexities of a Program Agreement, J. EQUIPMENT
LasE FINANCING, Fall 1997, at 3, 5.
176 Supplemental Technology-Bank Software-Lessor Interview, supra note 149 (tran-
script at 2) (describing the institution's preference for vendor-finance programs with ven-
dors that have "mission critical" software); see Seketa Interview, supra note 130 (transcript
at 4) (statement of software financier) (noting the focus of financing on "relationships
with established licensors, and more often than not established products"); Hayden Inter-
view, supra note 9 (transcript at 2-3) (describing the process by which one software lessor
selects vendors with whom it will deal); see also Veatch, supra note 175, at 3 (describing the
importance of a determination that financed software is "mission critical"). As one lessor
noted, by focusing on mission critical software, "you are going to have the end user want to
pay that as timely as they would pay their heat [or] electrical bill." Supplemental Technol-
ogy-Bank Software-Lessor Interview, supra note 149 (transcript at 8).
177 See Wetzel Interview, supra note 13 (transcript at 5) (statement of software lessor)
(explaining that all of his defaults have occurred in transactions in which the borrower was
liquidating its business); Hayden Interview, supra note 9 (transcript at 8) (acknowledging
that defaults occur when "you've got companies thatjust flat can't pay anybody-even the
electric company-and they are going to have their electricity and their phone shut off
and they are also not going to pay us"); Giulla Interview, supra note 125 (transcript at 10-
11) (acknowledging defaults by bankrupt borrowers).
178 To initiate electronic self-help, the software vendor (or lender) gets access to the
software of a defaulting user and terminates the end-user's software remotely through a
code trigger designed for that purpose. A number of software financiers report arrange-
ments that provide electronic self-help; but none acknowledge that they ever have used
that remedy. See Wetzel Interview, supra note 13 (transcript at 5-6); Hayden Interview,
supra note 9 (transcript at 3-4).
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of the termination of use as a remedy in software-acquisition transac-
tions, but they cannot obscure its potential if properly designed and
limited. Moreover, the beauty of the remedy in this context is that the
lender has little incentive for opportunistic behavior; the lender ob-
tains even less out of a vindictive termination of the software's use
than an automobile lender obtains out of a vindictive repossession of
a used car.179
For example, one lender suggested that he always would obtain a
court order rather than try to force a resistant borrower to cease use
of the software.' 80 Although that approach sounds like a more expen-
sive course of action than the typical secured creditor's remedy (a la
Repo Man), the cost of the lawsuit did not trouble him. His transac-
tions, typical of the market, are relatively large (averaging in the low
six-figure range), 18' and the lawsuit for nonpayment should be sim-
ple. Moreover, in his experience, the prospect of ruin that borrowers
would face upon termination makes the likelihood of their nonpay-
ment so small that the lender is willing to bear its costs in the rare
cases in which payment is not voluntarily forthcoming. 8 2
The overall picture of software-acquisition lending reflects the
same story as the discussion of software-development financing. In
this arena, as in that one, the absence of any realistic possibility of
liquidation has not prevented software purchasers from obtaining the
necessary funding for their transactions. Circumstances could change
significantly if courts (or legislatures) step in to provide definitive in-
validation (or approval) of the remedy, but in the current situation
the evidence suggests that the remedy of termination of use is as effec-
tive as, and perhaps even more effective than, the conventional se-
cured creditor's remedy of repossession and foreclosure.
179 See Seketa Interview, supra note 130 (transcript at 10) ("It is... a real or perceived
hammer.... [Y] ou know, the utility company may have the right to shut off the utilities for
a big company, but rarely would they."). For a general theoretical discussion of the bene-
fits and burdens of remedies that rely on the kind of in terrorem effect at issue here, see
Mann, Veification Institutions, supra note 5, at 2229-41.
180 See Bazrod Interview, supra note 9 (transcript at 12).
181 See i&. (transcript at 3).
182 See id. (transcript at 16) (expressing his reluctance to use self-help to terminate the
use of software by one of his borrowers); see also Supplemental Technology-Bank Software-
Lessor Interview, supra note 149 (transcript at 10-11) (statement of bank officer specializ-
ing in software leasing) (noting that he would be reluctant to rely on electronic self-help
without up-front judicial validation). Although the first of those lenders closes hundreds
of transactions each year, he has never had to file suit. See Bazrod Interview, supra note 9
(transcript at 8); see also Wetzel Interview, supra note 13 (transcript at 5) (statement of
software lessor) (explaining that he has never exercised remedies because all of his de-
faults occurred in transactions in which the borrower was closing its business). One lender
recounted the closest confrontation as follows: "We had an experience where the person
was very slow in payment and finally, after a number of broken promises, we said we are
coming in to take it-to take that software[-] and then the lessee paid up." Bazrod Inter-
view, supra note 9 (transcript at 8).
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B. Secured and Unsecured Software Lenders in Bankruptcy
Because the arrangements that businesses have developed to fa-
cilitate software-acquisition financing rely on a contractual remedy
against the purchaser, the legal treatment of that remedy is important
to the effectiveness of the arrangement. The relevant legal rules con-
sistently use a distinction between transactions in which the lender has
a security interest in collateral and those in which the lender does not.
Essentially, the law classifies creditors into two groups-secured credi-
tors and unsecured creditors-and then provides special benefits to
those creditors that fall within the "secured" classification. It should
be clear from the evidence presented above that any such classifica-
tion of software-financing transactions rests on fortuities rather than
the substance of those transactions. Thus, use of that classifying
scheme can harm those transactions, even if the law generally is
designed to foster lending transactions.
The Bankruptcy Code is the principal area of current law in
which that classification comes into play.18 3 The principal bank-
ruptcy-related concern for the software lender is the trustee's strong-
arm power under section 544 of the Bankruptcy Code.' 84 Here, the
test for whether a claim is secured is whether the claim to a particular
asset is one that could be defeated by a hypothetical creditor that ob-
tained a judgment lien as of the date of bankruptcy. 185 A secured
claim-one that could not be so defeated-is protected in bankruptcy
183 The proposed Article 2B of the Uniform Commercial Code, which would have gov-
erned software transactions generally, included for quite some time a variety of provisions
related to software financing. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2B-102(21) (Proposed Discussion Draft
Aug. 1998) (defining "financier"); U.C.C. § 2B-619(d) (Proposed Discussion Draft Aug.
1998) (validating "hell-and-high-water" clauses in software transactions involving finan-
ciers); U.C.C. § 2B-716 (Proposed Discussion Draft Feb. 1998) (validating clauses granting
financiers a right of self-help). Those provisions would not have had a significant positive
effect, because the narrow definition of "financier" generally would not have protected the
software lessor discussed here. See U.C.C. § 2B-102(21) (limiting "financier" status to lend-
ers in transactions governed by Article 2A or 9 of UCC). In any event, the significance of
those provisions has diminished considerably with the recent decision to remove the Arti-
cle 2B project from the UCC and to institute a freestanding Uniform Computer Informa-
tion Transactions Act. See Fred H. Miller & Carlyle C. Ring, Article 2B's New Uniform: A Free-
Standing Computer Information Transactions Ac4 UCC BuLL., June 1999, at 1, 1-2 (discussing
the decision of the American Law Institute to terminate its association with the Article 2B
project). The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws did adopt
the Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act at its 1999 meeting, but it remains to
be seen whether that statute can gain any significant adoptions. Its widely publicized rejec-
tion by the American Law Institute certainly casts doubt on the hopes of its drafters for
widespread acceptance. See NCCUSL Gives Final Approval to Model Laws on Electronic Signa-
tures, Software Licenses, 68 U.S.L.W. 2069 (Aug. 10, 1999).
184 See 11 U.S.C. § 544(a) (1) (1994).
185 See, e.g., DAVID G. EPSTEIN, STEVE H. NicamLs &JmF.sJ. Wrrz, BANKRupcy § 6-61,
at 390-93 (1993) (discussing how § 544(a) makes the trustee a hypothetical lien creditor).
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proceedings. 18 6 An unsecured claim-one that could be so de-
feated-is inferior to the rights of the bankruptcy trustee, so that the
creditor has no substantial claim in the bankruptcy proceeding. 8 7
Given the limited likelihood that anybody-secured creditor, un-
secured creditor, or bankruptcy trustee-will be able to liquidate the
software for a substantial monetary recovery, 8 8 it is natural to ask why
a creditor would worry about the possibility that its interest might be
classified in bankruptcy as unsecured. The answer is not that lenders
want to preserve the classic secured creditor's right to the liquidation
value of the collateral, but rather that they want to preserve an entitle-
ment to the enterprise value that the software carries with it.189 If the
lender has a perfected security interest in all of the borrower's assets
except for the software, then the bankruptcy court might allow other
claimants to capture a substantial portion of the value of the enter-
prise based on the claim that the business would be substantially less
valuable without the software. 190
To avoid that obstacle, the lender has a strong interest in struc-
turing a transaction that bankruptcy courts will classify as secured. Be-
cause of the difficulties explained above, efforts to structure the
transaction as secured are in some sense a sham, because (at least in
186 See, e.g., id §6-61, at 391-92 ("[T]he third person's interest is unaffected by section
544(a) if, under state law, her interest primes the trustee's claim as lien creditor....").
187 See, e.g., id. § 6-61, at 391 ("[T]he consequence is prescribed by federal law, section
544(a), which is that the trustee can entirely avoid the inferior third-party interest."). As
Steve Harris has pointed out to me, the textual discussion may be a bit too pessimistic
about the bankruptcy treatment of the lender with a right to terminate. There is some
support for the notion that a licensor with a right to prevent a transfer of a licensee's
interest in the license can enforce its rights in bankruptcy. See Board of Trade v. Johnson,
264 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1924). Although it seems unlikely to me, that line of reasoning plausibly
could be extended to the present context.
It also might be possible to structure a transaction so that the lender's arrangement
qualifies as an executory contract. For example, in a back-to-back license-sublicense ar-
rangement, the sublicense from the lender to the borrower might be an executory con-
tract, on the theory that the borrower owes continuing monetary performance and the
lender owes a continuing duty to permit use of the software. If the arrangement does
qualify as an executory contract, the lender would achieve the functional equivalent of
secured status, because the borrower would be obligated either to perform as agreed or
permit cancellation of the agreement. See generally EpsTmrN, NIcrcEs & WHrrE, supra note
185, §§ 5-5 to -7 (discussing executory contracts in bankruptcy). That possibility, however,
does not seem all that significant given the considerable resistance lenders have shown to
the back-to-back license-sublicense structure. See supra notes 139-40 (discussing the de-
creasing use of that structure).
188 See supra Part I.
189 Cf Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash, 520 U.S. 953, 955-56 (1997) (holding that
when a borrower retains collateral in a nonliquidation bankruptcy proceeding, the credi-
tor is entitled to the value of the collateral in place-the going-concern or "replacement"
value-rather than the liquidation value of the collateral).
190 For the same reasons that the lender's right to terminate the use of the software is
such a powerful remedy, it is entirely reasonable for a court to view the business without
the software as much less valuable than the business with the software.
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cases in which the licensor does not or will not consent), those efforts
will not result in a legal right to obtain the collateral. Nevertheless,
the desire to obtain the favored status in bankruptcy currently moti-
vates some lenders to go through the motions of obtaining a security
agreement and filing a financing statement-even in transactions in
which they know that they have no right to liquidate the collateral. 19'
Indeed, the revised version of Article 9 encourages those pseudo-
secured transactions. As discussed above, section 9-408 of the UCC
resolves the tension between licensor and lender interests by expressly
stating that the security interest attaches to the collateral for purposes
of Article 9, even though the lender cannot enforce the interest
against the collateral. 192 But a security interest that carries with it
neither a right of liquidation nor a right to possess or use the collat-
eral has little or no state-law significance. And the Article 9 drafters
plainly recognized what they were doing: comment 7 to section 9-408
explains that the provision is designed only to serve the interest de-
scribed above-to ensure that the lender would receive any proceeds
from a sale of the debtor's software in bankruptcy. 193
Thus, we end up with a complete disjunction between the formal
purpose of the secured transaction-to secure for the lender a right
to liquidate specific assets-and its functional use-to obtain favored
treatment in a business reorganization of the borrower. Such a result
directly calls into question the distinction in section 544(a) of the
Bankruptcy Code between the favored secured claims and the unfa-
vored unsecured claims.
Although the distinction is fundamental to the bankruptcy sys-
tem, it is difficult to understand as a theoretical matter why the line
should be drawn between secured and unsecured claims. One re-
sponse might be that the Takings Clause requires protection for se-
cured creditors because their interests constitute property protected
by the Constitution. It seems unlikely, however, that the Supreme
Court would find that the Constitution limits Congress's ability to im-
pose mild restrictions on the recovery of secured creditors in bank-
191 See McAuley Interview, supra note 10 (transcript at 9-10) (discussing the "false sense
of collateral" that lenders obtain when they have no right to remarket the underlying
software); Bazrod Interview, supra note 9 (transcript at 14-15) (acknowledging the absence
of a liquidation right for a security interest taken without the licensor's consent, but never-
theless asserting its importance for bankruptcy-planning purposes); see also supra notes 167-
68 and accompanying text (reporting interviews with lenders stating that they formally take
security interests with the understanding that they have no right to repossess or liquidate
the collateral).
192 See supra Part I.B.4.
193 "Under this section... the security interest would attach to the [collateral]. As a
result, the security interest would attach to the proceeds of any sale of the [collateral] while
the bankruptcy is pending." U.C.G. § 9-408 cmt. 7, example 4.
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ruptcy.'94 Moreover, nobody could dispute the constitutionality of a
provision that elevated other creditors to the favored treatment cur-
renfly offered to secured creditors. More generally, similar reasoning
convinces me that arguments about fairness to creditors are unlikely
to provide a useful basis for determining which creditor remedies
should be recognized in bankruptcy.19 5
A more functional rationale for the distinction between secured
and unsecured claims might be that the current bankruptcy favoritism
for secured creditors mirrors the results that would occur in a state-
court liquidation. Designing a bankruptcy system that mirrors those
results as closely as possible enhances the incentives of creditors to
exercise the forethought to protect themselves in the state-law sys-
tem. 96 But that distinction cannot justify the hypothetical-lien-credi-
tor distinction either. As should be clear from the first two parts of
this Article, the creditor that relies on a security interest to obtain
repayment of its software loan is the foolish one; the wise one relies on
a right to force payment through a threat of termination of the bor-
rower's right to use the software. Thus, the unsecured creditor with a
right to terminate has done every bit as much to protect itself in a
practical sense as the conventional secured creditor19 7
194 SeeJames Steven Rogers, The Impairment of Secured Creditors' Rights in Reorganization:
A Study of the Relationship Between the Fifth Amendment and the Bankruptcy Clause, 96 HARv. L.
REv. 973, 977-97 (1983) (explaining why it is implausible to interpret the Takings Clause to
prohibit impairment of the rights of secured creditors in bankruptcy). Rogers argues that
any constitutional limits derive from the Bankruptcy Clause, U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
See Rogers, supra, at 977-97. Although there is little precedent addressing the limits that the
Clause might impose on prospective legislation, I find it implausible to suggest that the
Bankruptcy Clause requires Congress to draw the line it currently draws in favor of inter-
ests protected against state judgment lien holders. Surely that Clause would permit Con-
gress to draw lines distinguishing between creditors on grounds reasonably related to the
circumstances of the creditors. See Rogers, supra at 998-1005 (analyzing the cases inter-
preting the Clause).
195 For a more detailed explanation of the inconclusive nature of the arguments, see
RonaldJ. Mann, Bankruptcy and the Entitlements of the Government: Whose Money Is It Anyway,
70 N.Y.U. L. REv. 993, 1038-53 (1995).
196 For example, Douglas Baird argues:
Legal rights should turn as little as possible on the forum in which one
person or another seeks to vindicate them. Whenever we must have a legal
rule to distribute losses in bankruptcy, we must also have a legal rule that
distributes the same loss outside of bankruptcy. All Jackson and I advocate
is that these two rules be the same.
Douglas G. Baird, Loss Distribution, Forum Shopping and Bankruptcy: A Reply to Warren, 54 U.
Cm. L. REv. 815, 822 (1987) (footnote omitted); see also Robert K. Rasmussen & David A.
Skeel, Jr., The Economic Analysis of Corporate Bankruptcy Law, 3 Am. BAuNa. INST. L. REv. 85,
85-87 (1995) (making a similar point).
197 I do not treat the unsecured creditor as more protected; I assume that the perfected
secured creditor probably has a right to terminate the borrower's right to use the software
under the general provisions of Article 9, which permit the lender to disable the collateral
as a remedy for nonpayment. That is not, however, entirely obvious, because the provision
granting that right is by its own terms limited to tangible collateral. See U.C.C. § 9-
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Thus, the normative justification for recognition of creditors'
rights in bankruptcy is neither a concern for fairness to creditors' 98
nor an invariable desire to replicate the results of the state-law system.
I prefer context-specific determinations of the value that the financ-
ing system as a whole gains from protection of the device in question.
Hence, I am inclined as a theoretical matter to support a liquidation
preference for secured creditors only to the extent that such a prefer-
ence lowers the overall costs of financing transactions. 199
Although we rarely are likely to have empirical information ade-
quate to resolve those theoretical inquiries definitively, we neverthe-
less must move forward with policies for commerce as it develops. In
the context at hand, the limited information described above is ade-
quate to convince me that the bankruptcy system should respect the
software lender's termination right, at least with respect to software
for which that lender has provided purchase money. The right to ter-
minate is an effective and relatively low-cost remedy that facilitates a
substantial amount of financing that apparently would not be avail-
able otherwise.200 Moreover, recognition of that remedy in bank-
ruptcy appears to be important to the system, both in the sense that
transacting parties seem to be concerned about that point ex ante,
and in the sense that the remedy in question plainly is central to the
success of the transactions.201 At bottom, bankruptcy recognition
would extend the effectiveness of the remedy. As privately designed,
the remedy effectively delivers value to the creditor when the business
continues to operate. Bankruptcy recognition would do what private
institutional design cannot-provide for an allocation to the creditor
609(a)(2) ("After default, a secured party[,] without removal, may render equipment
unusable .. ").
198 On that point, it bears noting that the transactions examined in this Article involve
relatively sophisticated businesses.
199 My previous work suggests several reasons to believe that secured credit does lower
those costs. See Mann, supra note 3, at 638-58. What is not clear, however, is the extent to
which those benefits are offset by costs externalized to other creditors or the extent to
which the benefits are attributable to the liquidation priority. I have argued elsewhere that
in some contexts the liquidation priority plays only a small role in obtaining the benefit of
secured transactions. See Mann, Small-Business Secured Credit, supra note ????, at 11-26;
Mann, Verification Institutions, supra note 5, at 2244-47.
200 See supra Part III.A.2.
201 See Seketa Interview, supra note 130 (transcript at 8-9) (describing defaulting trans-
actions, in which the only case of cessation of payment was a transaction in which the
purchaser took refuge in bankruptcy). In both respects, the present analysis suggests that
bankruptcy recognition is more important in the context of software financing than it is for
general secured creditors-not less. For one thing, it is not at all clear that the liquidation
priority preserved in bankruptcy is central to the success of secured credit generally. See
supra note 199. Moreover, anecdotal evidence undermines the view that the bankruptcy
liquidation priority is of central importance to the parties considering a secured transac-
tion. See Mann, supra note 75, at 237-43.
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in situations in which the business has sought refuge in the forum of
the bankruptcy court.
My sense that the adverse effects of termination on third parties
are relatively limited has influenced my views significantly. The right
of termination would pose a prospect of significant dislocation to
third-party customers of the borrower if the termination right were
exercised injudiciously-termination of an airline reservation system
would harm third parties just as surely as an employee sickout.20 2 But
that has not occurred to date, apparently because of the just concerns
lenders have that precipitous use of the remedy might expose them to
liability.203
It also troubles me that recognition of the unfiled interest of the
software lender could impose costs on third-party lenders that are un-
able to discover the claim of the software lender.20 4 The optimal re-
sponse to that problem probably would be to condition bankruptcy
recognition of the software lender's termination right on a public fil-
ing that gives sufficient notice of its interest. Current technology
should make it easy to design a filing system in which the cost of filing
would be quite low and in which competing creditors could discover
the software lender's interest easily, quickly, and without undue
expense.
It is, however, unrealistic to expect a software-financing fiing sys-
tem in the foreseeable future. As a state-law matter, Article 9 of the
UCC recently completed a lengthy revision process; further revisions
to its filing provisions cannot be expected for decades. Moreover, it is
202 1 thank Jay Westbrook for the example.
203 See supra note 182. I doubt that bankruptcy recognition of the lender's right to
terminate would make lenders significantly more hasty in exercising their remedies before
a bankruptcy filing, and the automatic stay in 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) should police hasty ac-
tions that might occur after such a filing. In any event, those concerns also could be mini-
mized by a codification of the apparent industry practice of giving advance notice and
opportunity to cure or, perhaps, judicial pre-approval of termination. Cf U.C.C. § 2B-716
(Proposed Discussion Draft Feb. 1998) (permitting self-help in secured software financing
transactions if the financier gives advance notice before exercising self-help). My primary
concern would be that in the absence of any evidence of a significant rate of improper
termination, a requirement of judicial pre-approval would impose delay and transaction
costs that serve no purpose.
204 That concern motivated a subcommittee of the Business Law Section of the Ameri-
can Bar Association to oppose the validation of self-help for unsecured software financiers
during the Article 2B process. See Memorandum from the American Bar Association Sub-
committee on Software Contracting to the National Conference of Uniform Law Commis-
sioners 2 (Apr. 7, 1997), available in <http://www.2bguide.com/docs/abafin.html>
(opposing inclusion of provisions protecting unsecured financiers); see also E-mail from
Mark S. Bazrod, President, LPI Software Funding Group, Inc., to RonaldJ. Mann 1 (Feb.
17, 1999) (on file with author) (arguing that "from the standpoint of other creditors of the
licensee, I think non-filing and security interest status is unacceptable and also unfair").
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not perfectly clear that a state-law filing system would be effective.205
Furthermore, any suggestion that Congress might upgrade the repre-
hensibly execrable state of the intellectual-property filing systems
must acknowledge the glacial pace at which Congress responds to
such concerns and the likelihood that a federal statutory fix might
make the situation even less certain.20 6
The harder question is whether it is appropriate to recognize the
lender's termination right in a legal system in which such filings are
not made. I think it is. For one thing, it is not uncommon to elevate
the rights of unfied creditors over the rights of filed commercial lend-
ers. Two prominent instances provide close parallels to the situation
at hand. First, the claim of a filed secured creditor will be subordinate
to the later claim of a purchase-money lender on equipment, even if
the equipment lender provides no notice to the first-in-time filed se-
cured creditor.20 7 That provision cannot plausibly rest on the notion
that the first-in-time lender will conduct periodic UCC searches to dis-
cover the later purchase-money lender. Rather, it must rest on the
functional justification that protection for the equipment lender will
not unduly harm the transactions in which the first-in-time lender is
likely to engage.208
Similarly, the claims of equipment lessors are respected in bank-
ruptcy even though they provide no public notice of their interest. 20 9
205 It should be permissible to include such filings in a state-law system. Because the
lender claims no right to use or resell the software, it should not fall afoul of the federal-
preemption problem discussed supra in Part I.B.1. The lack of clarity in the preemption
analysis, however, suggests that federal statutory validation of a state-law filing system would
be important.
206 Federal commercial statutes historically have been much less sensitive to the com-
plicated concerns of professionals in the affected industry, which the UCC reform process
can accommodate.
207 See U.C.G. § 9-324(a); see also U.C.C. § 9-324(b) (conditioning purchase-money pri-
ority of an inventory lender on advance notice to existing filed lender).
208 For extended discussions of some reasons why that might be so, see Hideki Kanda
& Saul Levmore, Explaining Creditor Priorities, 80 VA. L. Rxv. 2103, 2138-41 (1994) (defend-
ing Article 9's rules on purchase-money priorities as striking "a difficult balance" between
the danger to earlier creditors of risk alteration and the benefit to society of efficiency
gained through later-in-time decision making) and Paul M. Shupack, Defending Purchase
Money Security Interests Under Article 9 of the UCC from Professor Buckley, 22 IND. L. Rxv. 777,
783-97 (1989) (describing the benefits of the UCC's purchase-money priority system). But
see F.H. Buckley, The Bankruptcy Porioity Puzzle 72 VA. L. Ray. 1393, 1461-70 (1986) (criticiz-
ing purchase-money priorities as unjustified). Of course, the purchase-money equipment
lender cannot retain priority over later lenders unless it perfects by filing. U.C.C. § 9-
322(a). But that does not undermine my point that the system readily accommodates a
situation in which a first-in-time filed lender can lose to a later-in-time lender even if the
filed lender has no notice of the later lender. As the equipment-leasing example discussed
below demonstrates, some unfied interests also prevail over fied lenders that are either
earlier or later. See infra text accompanying notes 209-11.
209 See Charles W. Mooney, Jr., The Mystery and Myth of "Ostensible Ownership" and Article
9Filing- A Critique of Proposals to Extend Filing Requirements to Leases, 39 AlA. L. Ray. 683, 694-
96 (1988).
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That is true notwithstanding the long-standing and prominent aca-
demic arguments that equipment lessors so closely resemble secured
creditors that their priority should be conditioned on public notice of
their interests. 210 The justification for the current law, of course, is a
general sense that the benefit of continued protection of equipment
lessors in terms of facilitating equipment leasing outweighs the harm
to general all-assets lenders.21'
From the perspective of an existing lender with a filed security
interest, the software-acquisition lender plays a role quite similar to
the equipment lender or equipment lessor. The software-acquisition
lender directly funds the borrower's purchase of assets used in the
operation of the borrower's business and seeks a claim limited to re-
moval of the funded assets. Because the existing lender has not ad-
vanced funds to acquire the new assets, it does not harm the existing
lender unduly to give the new lender priority with respect to the new
assets. 2 12 The same analysis suggests that it is appropriate to recognize
the rights of the software lender.
In sum, the benefits of bankruptcy recognition of the termination
right of the purchase-money software lender seem to be significant.
Moreover, the resulting harm to third parties seems to be managea-
ble, particularly by comparison to the closely analogous contexts in
which the law already validates nonfiled interests. Therefore, the
bankruptcy system should recognize the validity of the software
lender's termination right.2 13
CONCLUSION
Commercial-law reform is a daunting task because it requires an
understanding not only of the successes and failures of the existing
legal rules as a logical system (Where are the rules clear and unclear?
Where do they fail to fit together coherently?), but also of the transac-
tional background against which those rules operate. That task is
210 See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H.Jackson, Possession and Ownership: An Exami-
nation of the Scope of Article 9, 35 STAN. L. REv. 175, 187-88 (1983) (explaining that the effect
of leases and secured transactions on third parties is the same and arguing that the two
transactions warrant the same treatment).
211 For a thorough analysis of the question, justifying the current treatment of equip-
ment lessors, see generally Mooney, supra note 209.
212 An extensive literature examines the priority generally granted to purchase-money
lenders. See supra note 208.
213 Because the primary goal of this Article is to describe and analyze the transactions
in the software-finance industry, it is beyond the scope of the Article to develop a detailed
proposal to implement the recommendation in the text. In particular, it is not clear to me
whether it would be better to implement the proposal by treating software-acquisition
loans as a special type of executory contract so that the lender could terminate use of the
software if payment was not forthcoming, cf. supra note 187 (discussing that possibility
under current law), or by treating software-acquisition lenders as a special type of quasi-
secured claimant.
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doubly difficult when it focuses on an area in which technological de-
velopments lead to transactions that change in design as quickly as
they do in the software industry.
When the UCC originally'was promulgated, the drafters tried to
develop legal rules that responded to the felt needs of the transactions
in which businesses actually were engaged at the time.2 14 The
software-financing industry presents a new challenge to the commer-
cial-law drafters: asset-based transactions in which there are no assets
to liquidate. In my view, the law should act to validate those transac-
tions. Of course, it would be plausible to object that it is just too soon
to institutionalize a legal response that validates those first efforts in a
newly created and still developing field. But I believe the evidence
presented in this Article is adequate to justify the limited support I
propose-bankruptcy recognition of the software lenders' right to ter-
minate. That treatment grants those lenders nothing more than
equality with other institutional lenders whose transactions formally
qualify as secured transactions. Given the value of the transactions to
businesses seeking to acquire software, that treatment seems to be en-
tirely appropriate.
But stepping back from the legal reforms discussed for the
software-acquisition lender, the more important goal of this Article is
to illustrate the power of private institutional arrangements. In both
of the contexts discussed in this Article-software-development lend-
ing and software-acquisition lending-lenders have no access to tradi-
tional liquidation-style remedies. The ease with which lenders in
those two rapidly developing contexts have constructed transactional
structures that overcome that problem is a tribute to the power of
private institutions to capture contractual value. The importance of
those institutions, in turn, is a strong reminder to commercial-law
scholars that they can never understand the systems that they study
unless they understand the private arrangements to which the formal
legal rules apply.
214 See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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